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A synthetic approach to Markov kernels, conditional
independence and theorems on sufficient statistics
Tobias Fritz
Abstract. We develop Markov categories as a framework for synthetic probability and
statistics, following work of Golubtsov as well as Cho and Jacobs. This means that
we treat the following concepts in purely abstract categorical terms: conditioning and
disintegration; various versions of conditional independence and its standard properties;
conditional products; almost surely; sufficient statistics; versions of theorems on sufficient
statistics due to Fisher–Neyman, Basu, and Bahadur.
Besides the conceptual clarity offered by our categorical setup, its main advantage
is that it provides a uniform treatment of various types of probability theory, including
discrete probability theory, measure-theoretic probability with general measurable spaces,
Gaussian probability, stochastic processes of either of these kinds, and many others.
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1. Introduction
Probability theory and statistics are traditionally built on measure theory as a foun-
dation. This has facilitated the development of a rich and diverse network of theoretical
results and practical methods, comprising areas as distinct as stochastic PDEs, large devia-
tion theory, and machine learning. In some of these areas, it is quite common to work with
measure theory directly by applying its basic axioms such as σ-additivity. The position
that we take in this paper is that this methodology is similar to programming a computer
directly in terms of machine code. Following seminal ideas of Lawvere [80], our goal is to
demonstrate that the appeal to such low-level machinery can frequently be avoided: there
are simple and purely algebraic axioms for “systems of Markov kernels” which allow us to
give high-level definitions of some of the basic concepts of probability and statistics, such as
probability spaces, random variables, independence and conditional independence, almost
surely, statistics and sufficient statistics, up to and including completeness and minimality
of statistics. The definitions of these concepts also allow us to derive a surprising number of
theorems on these notions purely abstractly: among other things, we prove abstract versions
of the semigraphoid properties of conditional independence as well as of the Fisher–Neyman
factorization theorem, Basu’s theorem and Bahadur’s theorem on sufficient statistics.
The advantages of this type of approach are various, and we now mention four points
in favour of it. First, perhaps the least interesting advantage is that we achieve a novel
understanding of the above mentioned concepts. Second, a more important point is the
greater generality achieved through the development of such a framework: there are many
different systems (categories1) of Markov kernels which satisfy our axioms, ranging from
probability theory on finite sets via Gaussian probability theory to full-fledged completely
general Markov kernels between measurable spaces and even to stochastic processes, where
probability theory takes place in time. Therefore our results immediately specialize to
different theorems in each one of these cases. There are other interesting categories which
satisfy the same axioms but have little to do with probability theory at all, and again our
results apply to them; a good example of such a Markov category is the category of sets
and multivalued functions, where the morphisms are not Markov kernels, but display largely
analogous behaviour.
Third, a related advantage of an abstract framework such as ours is that the axioms
are more high-level than the standard measure-theoretic ones. If using the standard ones
is analogous to programming a computer in machine code, then using the high-level ones
is analogous to programming a computer in a language which provides higher abstraction.
This enables the programmer to write larger and more complex programs whose functioning
is easier to grasp for human minds. As we will see, something similar happens in our context:
our proofs of theorems on sufficient statistics such as Basu’s are very simple and visual.
This should not be surprising, since a certain amount of proof difficulty already enters in
the proofs that a given system, such as measure-theoretic probability, satisfies our axioms.
Going beyond existing theorems, we expect that our abstract framework will also facilitate
1We use the words “category” and “categorical” exclusively in the sense of category theory, bearing no
relation to categorical data in the sense of statistics.
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the development of new and more complex results in theoretical statistics. Fourth, there
is a modularity advantage: most of our results only require a fragment of the axioms to be
satisfied, so that these results can be instantiated also in Markov categories where merely
this fragment holds.
The word “synthetic” in our title refers exactly to this idea of higher abstraction, suggest-
ing that we are dealing with an instance of the synthetic vs. analytic dichotomy. Roughly
speaking, a mathematical formalism or theory is analytic if it focuses on concrete and
specific implementation details, often so specific that they allow the user to answer any par-
ticular question in a definite way (at least in principle). The paradigmatic example of an
analytic theory is Descartes’ analytic geometry based on coordinate computations. On the
other hand, a formalism or theory is synthetic if it merely provides higher-level axioms or
even just inference rules for reasoning about the structures of interest. Euclid’s axioms for
planar geometry is the analogous paradigmatic example here. And indeed, doing geometry
in terms of Euclid’s axioms has advantages over analytic geometry which are parallel to
the ones outlined above2. In this case, the utility of these advantages has played out in a
very interesting way historically, leading to the development of other analytic models of a
fragment of the axioms, in the form of hyperbolic geometry and more generally Riemannian
geometry.
Let us briefly discuss one more well-established analogue for the relation between our
approach and the traditional measure-theoretic one. The theory of abelian categories is
an abstraction of the theory of modules over a ring bearing some conceptual similarity to
how our approach abstracts from the conventional foundations of probability and statistics.
Again the theory of abelian categories has similar advantages (and disadvantages) over
module theory. To see how these manifest themselves, consider the sentiment that abelian
categories are in some sense the “right” level of abstraction for the development of homologi-
cal algebra: the irrelevant implementation details of what the objects of an abelian category
“really are” have been abstracted away, while the focus is precisely on those structures that
are relevant to the development of homological algebra [59]. Moreover, the greater gen-
erality is useful in that not all applications of homological algebra are to categories of
modules; this happens e.g. in algebraic geometry, where many categories of sheaves are
abelian categories which are not categories of modules (not even up to equivalence) [99].
However, we certainly cannot claim that our formalism in its present form is as solid or
as definite as the theory of abelian categories. Indeed, we do not expect it to have reached
its final form, as some of the technical details in our definitions will almost surely be subject
to revision. Nevertheless, we believe that the basic spirit will remain unchanged, and has
the potential to become a new paradigm for the mathematical foundations of probability
and statistics.
Summary. We now summarize the main definitions and results of the paper, one
section at a time.
2Which is not to deny that analytic geometry, or analytic theories in general, have distinct advantages
over synthetic ones as well.
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⊲ Section 2 introduces Markov categories as our main protagonists (Definition 2.1), follow-
ing work of Golubtsov as well as Cho and Jacobs. These are categories which axiomatize
systems of Markov kernels. The axiomatized structures are sequential composition of
Markov kernels, their tensor product, as well as distinguished Markov kernels which im-
plement copying and discarding of values of random variables. These pieces of structure
are subject to certain natural compatibility conditions. We discuss the significance of
the axioms and introduce FinStoch, the category of Markov kernels (or stochastic ma-
trices) between finite sets (Example 2.5) as our basic running example, and FinSetMulti,
the category of finite sets and multivalued functions (Example 2.6).
⊲ The next few sections are dedicated to examples of Markov categories. This starts
with a general construction in Section 3, where we prove that the Kleisli category of a
monoidal affine monad on a Markov category is again a Markov category (Corollary 3.2).
⊲ Section 4 introduces our main examples besides FinStoch, namely the category of mea-
surable spaces and Markov kernels Stoch and its full subcategory of standard Borel
spaces BorelStoch. We recall how Stoch and BorelStoch arise via Corollary 3.2 as the
Kleisli category of the Giry monad.
⊲ Section 5 discusses the Kleisli category of the Radon monad, giving a Markov cate-
gory again per Corollary 3.2. It contains continuous Markov kernels between compact
Hausdorff spaces.
⊲ Section 6 shows how Gaussian probability theory is also described by a Markov category
denoted Gauss. Here, the morphisms are given by those Markov kernels Rn → Rm
which apply a linear transformation and add independent Gaussian noise with specified
expectation and variance.
After these concrete examples, Sections 7 to 9 provide general categorical recipes for con-
structing Markov categories. A reader whose primary interest is in theoretical statistics may
skip these without significant loss, and perhaps return to Section 7 on a second reading in
order to see how our results automatically generalize to stochastic processes.
⊲ Section 7 explains how we can construct new Markov categories by considering diagrams
of a given shape in a given Markov category. This implies in particular that all of our
definitions and results can be instantiated straightforwardly on stochastic processes,
since these are diagrams given by infinite sequences of deterministic morphisms.
⊲ Section 8 briefly describes the construction of Markov categories from hypergraph cat-
egories, recovering FinStoch and FinSetMulti as particular examples.
⊲ Section 9 explains how commutative comonoids in any symmetric monoidal category
form a Markov category with respect to the counit-preserving morphisms.
Having then treated examples of Markov categories in detail, at this point we turn to the
development of probability and statistics in the abstract framework of Markov categories.
⊲ Section 10 introduces deterministic morphisms in a Markov category as those mor-
phisms which preserve the comultiplication (Definition 10.1). We show that in FinStoch,
Stoch and Gauss, the deterministic morphisms are indeed exactly those which do not
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involve any randomness (Examples 10.3 to 10.5 and 10.7). The second half of the
section is devoted to certain categorical technicalities for Markov categories: we prove
that the structure morphisms are necessarily deterministic (Lemma 10.12), and show
that the subcategory of deterministic morphisms is a cartesian monoidal subcategory
(Remark 10.13). We then define the 2-category of Markov categories (Definition 10.14)
and prove a strictification theorem (Theorem 10.17) which states that every Markov
category is comonoid equivalent to another one in which the monoidal structure is
strict.
⊲ Section 11 introduces four possible additional axioms which a given Markov category
may or may not satisfy, and which we believe to have some relevance for probability
theory and statistics. The first one is the existence of conditionals (Definition 11.5),
which we later relate to general disintegrations (Proposition 11.17). The second one
is randomness pushback, formalizing the intuitive idea that any stochastic operation
can be implemented by first generating randomness and then executing a deterministic
function which uses the previously generated randomness as an additional input. Third,
we discuss another property which we call positivity (Definition 11.22), closely related
to the nonnegativity of probability, which will turn out to be useful in later proofs.
Fourth, we consider a condition which we call causality (Definition 11.31), expressing
the idea that if a choice between two processes does not affect how their outcome is
correlated with earlier outcomes, then there should not be any correlation with even
earlier outcomes either.
For each of these axioms, we also discuss which ones of our particular Markov
categories satisfy them. The existence of conditionals fails for Stoch (Examples 11.3
and 11.18) but holds in FinStoch, BorelStoch and Gauss (Examples 11.6 and 11.8).
Randomness pushback likewise holds in FinStoch and Gauss (Examples 11.20 and 11.21),
while we do not know whether it holds in Stoch. All of our main examples satisfy the
positivity axiom (Lemma 11.24 and Example 11.25) as well as the causality axiom
(Proposition 11.34 and Example 11.35).
⊲ Section 12 treats conditional independence in our setting. We give various definitions
of conditional independence for different kinds of morphisms (Definitions 12.1, 12.12,
12.16 and 12.19), including the difference on whether one wants to condition on an
input or on an output (or both). We prove corresponding versions of the semigraphoid
properties (Lemmas 12.5 and 12.13 and Propositions 12.17 and 12.20), and various
results on how conditional independences propagate across composition of morphisms
(Proposition 12.18). Our main innovation on conditional independence over previous
work of Cho and Jacobs is that we do not assume the existence of conditionals.
Furthermore, in the presence of conditionals, we also develop the theory of condi-
tional products of joint distributions, showing that these can be defined and satisfy
axioms originally proposed by Dawid and Studeny´ in any Markov category which has
conditionals (Definition 12.8 and after).
⊲ Section 13 treats almost sure equality (Definition 13.1), again following an idea of Cho
and Jacobs. We prove a number of lemmas on the compositional structure of almost sure
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equality. We also construct the category of probability spaces and Markov kernels mod-
ulo almost sure equality in any Markov category satisfying causality (Proposition 13.9).
This implies that Bayesian inversion is a symmetric monoidal dagger functor, solving
an open problem posed by Clerc, Danos, Dahlqvist and Garnier (Remark 13.10). We
then introduce the concept of almost sure determinism (Definition 13.11) as another
example of how our setup allows for a systematic relativization of probabilistic concepts
with respect to almost surely. Finally, we introduce a candidate definition of support
of a morphism (Definition 13.20), conjecturally recovering the usual notion of support
of a probability measure (Remark 13.21).
⊲ The final three sections are devoted to the development of some of the basic notions
and theorems of statistics within our formalism. This theory frequently makes use
of aspects of conditional independence as studied in Section 12, in line with Dawid’s
arguments on the central role of conditional independence in statistics.
Section 14 starts by introducing statistical models (Definition 14.1) and statistics
(Definition 14.2), leading up to the definition of sufficient statistic (Definition 14.3).
This is followed by Theorem 14.5, which seems to be an abstract close relative of the
Fisher–Neyman factorization theorem. This interpretation is corroborated by showing
that our result indeed induces the Fisher–Neyman factorization in the case of FinStoch
(Example 14.6).
⊲ Section 15 builds on the previous section by treating the completeness of statistics.
Observing that the notion of completeness is secretly a property of Markov kernels in
general (Remark 15.2), we find a simple definition of completeness within our abstract
formalism (Definition 15.1). We show that it specializes to bounded completeness in
the case of Stoch (Example 15.4). After defining ancillary statistics (Definition 15.7),
we then prove an abstract version of Basu’s theorem (Theorem 15.8).
Theorem (Basu). Any complete sufficient statistic for a given statistical model is
independent of any ancillary statistic.
⊲ Section 16 goes further by introducing minimal sufficient statistics within our abstract
setup (Definition 16.2), based on a preordering on the set of statistics for a given
statistical model which compares statistics by their informativeness (Definition 16.1).
We then state and prove an abstract version of Bahadur’s theorem.
Theorem (Bahadur). If a minimal sufficient statistic exists for a given statistical
model, then a complete sufficient statistic is minimal sufficient.
This concludes our summary. Let us reemphasize that all of our definitions should be
regarded as subject to further refinement. Of course, our results based on these preliminary
definitions are nevertheless definite.
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Discussion of prior work. The most important precursors to this paper are works by
Golubtsov [54, 55, 56, 57]3 as well as a recent paper by Cho and Jacobs [15]. The present
paper can be regarded as a sort of follow-up to these, and we will make frequent reference
to them. In particular, these prior authors already demonstrated that Markov categories4
can serve as a canvas for developing aspects of probability theory. Markov categories had
also been used somewhat implicitly in Fong’s study of the categorical semantics of Bayesian
networks [34].
However, synthetic approaches to probability and statistics in general have a long history
going back further than these works, and have been pursued mostly independently in several
scientific communities. We here provide a brief overview of the main literature that we are
currently aware of.
⊲ In category theory, categorical probability has been initiated by the work of Lawvere [80]
and Giry [49]. It has traditionally focused on the study of probability monads [98, Chap-
ter 1], providing formal descriptions of the measure-theoretic and functional-analytic as-
pects of probability [2, 86]. This is closely related to the present paper insofar as Kleisli
categories of probability monads are categories of Markov kernels, and should therefore
generally be expected to be Markov categories in the sense of Definition 2.1 (see also
Corollary 3.2).
⊲ Computer scientists have studied structural aspects of probability theory extensively,
often with applications to the semantics of probabilistic programs in mind. The seminal
paper of Cho and Jacobs [15] belongs to this area, as well as other work5 by Jacobs [16],
Panangaden [3], Simpson [107], Staton [63], and others. Due to the affinity of theoretical
computer scientists with category theory, there is a strong overlap here with work done by
category theorists. This subject seems to be currently maturing, as witnessed by the first
book-length treatment on structured probabilistic reasoning becoming available [67].
⊲ In mathematical statistics, there is a large number of papers on its foundations, some of
which have investigated approaches which are synthetic in flavour, and some of which use
categorical concepts either explicitly or implicitly. For example, this includes works by
Dawid on statistical operations [25], conditional independence [24, 26] and conditional
products [27], by Lauritzen on combining statistical models [90] and composing Gaussian
conditionals [79], as well as by McCullagh on the concept of statistic [91].
⊲ In noncommutative probability theory, synthetic notions of independence which general-
ize various concrete notions of independence have been studied using categorical methods,
such as free independence in free probability, for example in the works of Franz [38] as
well as Gerhold, Lachs and Schu¨rmann [48].
3Due to the substantial overlap between those papers, we generally only refer to [55] from now on,
which is easily digitally accessible. The references in those papers also point to earlier work of Golubtsov
on particular categories of interest, where some of the relevant concepts have been studied concretely.
4Or affine CD-categories in the terminology of Cho and Jacobs. The categories of information trans-
formers or IT-categories in the sense of Golubtsov are technically slightly different.
5The references listed are but a sample of these authors’ extensive works on the subject.
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⊲ In the foundations of quantum mechanics community, researchers have attempted to con-
struct quantum analogues of Bayesian inference and Bayesian networks. This endeavour
is crucially informed by having a synthetic approach to the classical case to begin with.
For example, the work of Coecke and Spekkens [21] belongs here.
⊲ In information geometry, Cˇencov had investigated the category Stoch as the “category
of statistical decisions” independently of Lawvere and Giry [11, 13], where it was used
subsequently as a canvas for studying entropic distances on probability measures [12,
92].
We have tried to integrate some discussion of what has been done in each of these areas,
to the best of our knowledge, into the main text. Nevertheless, it is almost inevitable that
some readers, in particular those coming from one of these particular fields, will feel that
their own area remains underrepresented in our presentation. For these readers, we hope
that the above list can provide some convenient entry points into the existing literature of
other communities which they may not be aware of.
Conventions and notation. Throughout, we use the term “Markov kernel” in the
standard sense, referring to a map between measurable spaces which takes every element
of the first space to a probability measure on the second space, such that a suitable measur-
ability requirement holds; see e.g. [76, Definition 8.25] or [94, De´finition III-2.1]. In other
words, “Markov kernel” is more or less synonymous with other terms like “transition kernel”,
“stochastic relation”, “stochastic map”, “probabilistic map”, “conditional distribution”, “chan-
nel”, “statistical operation”, “information transformer” and others (neither one of which we
will use). We present a detailed technical treatment of Markov kernels in Section 4. How-
ever, precisely because our categorical formalism is more general and more abstract than
the measure-theoretic one, most of our uses of the term “Markov kernel” will not require the
reader to know the technical details. It is perfectly enough to associate the term “Markov
kernel” merely with “noisy map”, i.e. a function whose output may be inherently random.
The morphisms in those Markov categories which are of interest in probability and statistics
are always some form of Markov kernels or noisy maps, even if the technical details may
differ. We also think of a morphism in a general Markov category as an abstract version of
a Markov kernel.
Our categorical setup is as follows. Throughout, C is a symmetric monoidal category
with monoidal unit I ∈ C and symmetry morphisms swapX,Y : X ⊗ Y → Y ⊗X. We freely
use string diagrams as the usual graphical calculus for symmetric monoidal categories [105],
as these are more intuitive and easier to parse for a human reader than long equations. Our
convention is that these string diagrams are to be read from bottom to top: the domain
of a composite morphism defined by a string diagram is at the bottom while the codomain
is on top. Hence our string diagrams can be interpreted as processes with time flowing
upwards. For example, (2.2) should be interpreted as stating that creating three copies of
an object can be achieved either by first copying and then copying the second copy again,
or first copying and then copying the first copy again. The symmetry morphisms swapX,Y
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are depicted graphically simply as crossings,
X Y
XY
While we usually leave out the object labels on the wires of our string diagrams, we occa-
sionally decorate the overall input and output wires by the corresponding object labels for
clarity and emphasis.
While the possibility of using string diagrams is very convenient, we do not regard it
as a central selling point of our framework. Rather, our main innovation lies in the greater
generality and conceptual clarity facilitated by a categorical treatment, independently of
which notation one uses for categorical reasoning.
Acknowledgments. We thank Ju¨rgen Jost and Hoˆng Vaˆn Leˆ for the discussions which
spurred this paper; Manuel Ba¨renz, Kenta Cho, Tomasˇ Gonda, Bart Jacobs, Dominique
Pastor, Paolo Perrone, Eigil Fjeldgren Rischel, Alex Simpson and David Spivak for useful
discussions and detailed feedback on a draft; Brendan Fong, TC Fraser, Richard Garner,
Paul Marriott, Arthur Parzygnat, Rob Spekkens, Sam Staton and Dario Stein for further
helpful discussions; Sam Tenka for pointing out Basu’s theorem and Bahadur’s theorem to
us; as well as Bob Coecke, Philip Dawid, Robert Furber, Peter Golubtsov, Alexander Kurz,
Steffen Lauritzen, Nina Otter and MathOverflow user Steve for additional valuable pointers
to the literature. Last but not least, we thank the creators of and contributors to the nLab
and TikZiT for having made research and dissemination in category theory so much easier.
Part of this work was conducted while the author was with the Max Planck Institute
for Mathematics in the Sciences.
2. Markov categories
Here, we introduce our main objects of study: Markov categories, which are symmetric
monoidal categories with extra structure which makes them behave (in many ways) like cat-
egories of Markov kernels. As far as we know, these kinds of categories have first appeared
in slightly different form6 in work of Golubtsov [55, Sections 2 and 3]. In the present form
they first played a major role in Fong’s work on the categorical structure of Bayesian net-
works [34], even if somewhat implicitly. They crop up similarly implicitly in later work by
Jacobs and Zanasi [69], and have subsequently been axiomatized explicitly by Cho and Ja-
cobs in their categorical approach to conditional independence and Bayesian inference [15].
Cho and Jacobs call them affine CD-categories, where “CD” stands for “Copy/Discard”,
describing the interpretation of the structure morphisms (2.1). Due to the central role that
these categories seem to play in probability and statistics, we introduce a catchier term
which hints at the idea that the morphisms in the categories under consideration behave
like Markov kernels.
6See Remark 10.19 for a discussion of the difference.
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2.1. Definition. A Markov category C is a symmetric monoidal category in which every
object X ∈ C is equipped with a commutative comonoid structure given by a comultiplication
copyX : X → X ⊗X and a counit delX : X → I, depicted in string diagrams as
== delXcopyX (2.1)
and satisfying the commutative comonoid equations,
= (2.2)
==
= (2.3)
as well as compatibility with the monoidal structure,
=
X ⊗ Y
X ⊗ Y X
=
Y
X ⊗ Y
X ⊗ Y
X Y X Y
X Y
(2.4)
and naturality of del, which means that
=f (2.5)
for every morphism f .
We usually think of a morphism in C as some form of Markov kernel, meaning that it
assigns to every input value a probability distribution over output values. The comultipli-
cation copyX then represents the map which takes an input value, copies it, and outputs
the two copies without introducing any randomness; while delX is the map which simply
discards its input and produces no output. The above equations then all acquire an intu-
itive meaning, such as that copying and discarding one copy is equal to simply outputting
the input, a property sometimes known as broadcasting [4].
The Markov kernel interpretation, including the role of copy and del, will be made
precise in Example 2.5 and Sections 4 and 5 by constructing actual categories of Markov
kernels which are Markov categories. The main purpose of our paper is to demonstrate that
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these pieces of structure are enough to develop a substantial amount of probability theory
and statistics.
The first concept from probability theory which acquires meaning in any Markov cate-
gory is that of a probability measure, or distribution; we prefer the latter term due to its
more open-ended connotation. A distribution is a Markov kernel which takes no input and
produces an output, interpreted as a “random element” of the codomain. This motivates
the definition that a distribution in any Markov category C is a morphism ψ : I → X from
the unit object I to some other object X, depicted in string diagram notation as
ψ
X
In the Markov category Stoch, our example from Section 4, these are precisely the probabil-
ity measures on measurable spaces X. We can now say that the pair (X,ψ) is a probability
space in C; in Stoch, this indeed specializes precisely to the traditional notion of probabil-
ity space. A random variable on (X,ψ) taking values in some other object Y can then
be defined to be a morphism f : X → Y , where one may want to impose the additional
requirement that f must be deterministic (Definition 10.1), and perhaps identify two such
morphisms as representing the same random variable as soon as they are ψ-almost surely
equal (Definition 13.1).7 The distribution of the random variable f is then given by the
composition fψ : I → Y ,
ψ
f
Y
so that the pair (Y, fψ) is also a probability space in C. This string diagram can be inter-
preted conveniently in terms of processes happening in time: first, ψ generates a random
element of X; second, this element is fed into the function f , which subsequently outputs
an element of Y . The overall effect is that we have produced a random element of Y ,
corresponding to the distribution of our random variable. One takeaway of this is that the
formalism of Markov categories unifies the concepts of probability distributions and random
variables by considering both of them as instances of the more general concept of Markov
kernel.
For objects X,Y ∈ C, morphisms ψ : I → X ⊗ Y correspond to joint distributions.
In the case of Stoch, these are exactly the probability measures on the product σ-algebra
on the product of measurable spaces X and Y . In general, such a joint distribution can
be marginalized over Y by composing with idX ⊗ delY . In terms of string diagrams, the
7Since we will have no need for the term “random variable” in this paper, we do not commit ourselves
to a particular definition of this concept yet, and mention it merely to illustrate how to work with Markov
categories. But see Remark 13.14 for further treatment of probability spaces in Markov categories.
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resulting composite morphism (idX ⊗ delY ) ◦ ψ can be conveniently depicted as
ψ
X
and similarly for marginalization over Y . Analogous statements apply to joint distributions
on more than two factors. Of course, these interpretations are also central to the work of
Cho and Jacobs [15], and have also been used prior to that e.g. in the work of Coecke and
Spekkens [21].
2.2. Remark. Written out in a way which explicitly keeps track of the structure isomor-
phisms in C, the first condition in (2.4) amounts to the commutativity of the diagram
X ⊗ Y I
X ⊗ Y I ⊗ Y I ⊗ I
delX⊗Y
∼=
delX⊗id id⊗delY
(2.6)
and similarly the second one is
X ⊗ Y (X ⊗ Y )⊗ (X ⊗ Y )
(X ⊗ (Y ⊗X)) ⊗ Y
(X ⊗ (X ⊗ Y ))⊗ Y
X ⊗ Y (X ⊗X)⊗ Y (X ⊗X)⊗ (Y ⊗ Y )
copyX⊗Y
∼=
(id⊗swap)⊗id
∼=
copyX⊗id id⊗copyY
(2.7)
where the unnamed isomorphisms are the monoidal unitors and composite associators.
2.3. Remark. One may also think that we should impose delI = copyI = idI , where I is
the monoidal unit. These constraints are automatic if C is strict, because then we have
delI ⊗ delI = delI , copyI ⊗ copyI = copyI ,
by assumption, as well as
delI ⊗ copyI = delI ◦ copyI = idI
in the commutative endomorphism monoid C(I, I). These properties imply
delI = delI ⊗ delI ⊗ copyI = delI ⊗ copyI = idI ,
and hence also copyI = idI .
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If C is not strict, then the equation copyI = idI is not actually well-typed. Rather, the
correct statement is that delI = idI and that copyI : I → I ⊗ I is equal to the unique
coherence isomorphism. The proof is similar.
By delI = idI and (2.5), we can conclude that I is a terminal object. Put differently,
our postulated properties of del can equivalently be phrased as saying that C should be a
semicartesian symmetric monoidal category, for which there are several equivalent charac-
terizations (see [83] and [48, Theorem 3.5]), with the simplest one being that I should be
terminal8 [66, Definition 2.1(ii)], another one being the notion of monoidal category with
projections as studied by Franz with a minor variation [38, Definition 3.3]9. In particular,
the first equation in (2.4) can also be seen as a consequence of the terminality of I.
2.4. Remark. It is well-known that if C is cartesian monoidal, then there is a unique
comonoid structure on every object. This makes C into a Markov category. However, the
interesting Markov categories are those not of this form.
While we will consider a substantial range of particular Markov categories in Sections 3
to 9, we now introduce two basic examples, which we start with due to the technical
simplicity of working with finite sets. We will use the first one throughout as our primary
running example.
2.5. Example. C may be FinStoch, the category of finite sets with Markov kernels. This
means that a morphism f : X → Y between finite sets10 X and Y is a stochastic matrix
(fxy)x∈X, y∈Y
11, where the entry fxy is interpreted as the probability that the Markov kernel
f returns output y on input x. Composition of morphisms is given by matrix multiplication.
In the following, we also use the suggestive notation f(y|x) for such a morphism f : X → Y ,
8This condition has also been considered in [15, 18, 74]. However, their claimed equivalence with (2.5)
is missing the assumption delI = idI .
9The minor variation is that in order for Franz’s definition to be equivalent to semicartesianness, one
needs to amend it by the extra condition that at least one of the two projections pi1, pi2 : I ⊗ I → I must
coincide with the structure isomorphism I ⊗ I
∼=
→ I , as per [84] and [48, Theorem 3.5]. If pi1 does, then any
f : X → I is equal to the composite X
∼=
→ I ⊗X
pi1
→ I due to the diagram
X I ⊗X I
I I ⊗ I I
f
∼=
id⊗f
pi1
∼= ∼=
where the right-hand square is a naturality square of pi1. In other words, I is terminal. Conversely, it is easy
to see that if I is terminal, then C is a monoidal category with projections satisfying the extra condition.
10The restriction to finite sets is not essential and can easily be lifted. The most general Markov cate-
gory relevant for discrete probability would be the one where the objects are sets (of arbitrary cardinality)
and a morphism f : X → Y is a matrix (fxy)x∈X,y∈Y with nonnegative real entries such that
∑
y∈Y
fxy = 1
for every x ∈ X. In particular, for every x there are at most countably many y with fxy > 0. We prefer to
use FinStoch as our version of discrete probability because of its simplicity.
11Recall that this means that fxy ≥ 0 and
∑
y
fxy = 1. While the primary case of interest is in matrices
with nonnegative real entries, one can in principle work with nonnegative entries in any ordered field, and
all results proven in this paper still hold just the same with the same proofs.
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so that composition of f with some g : Y → Z turns into the Chapman–Kolmogorov
equation,
(gf)(z|x) =
∑
y
g(z|y)f(y|x). (2.8)
There is a simple inclusion functor FinSet → FinStoch, which takes an honest function
between finite sets f : X → Y and turns it into a stochastic matrix: writing f for both by
abuse of notation, we have
f(y|x) :=
{
1 if y = f(x),
0 otherwise.
The symmetric monoidal structure on FinStoch is given by cartesian product at the level
of objects, and the tensor product of stochastic matrices at the level of morphisms: for
f : A→ X and g : B → Y ,
(f ⊗ g)(xy|ab) := f(x|a) g(y|b), (2.9)
with the obvious structure morphisms, inherited from the symmetric monoidal inclusion
functor FinSet → FinStoch based on the cartesian monoidal structure on FinSet. The
bifunctoriality of this tensor product is easy to verify.
Finally, the comonoid operations are also inherited from FinSet, which is a Markov
category by virtue of being cartesian monoidal. More concretely, delX : X → I is the
all-ones row vector indexed by the elements of X, which we formally write in the above
probability notation as
delX(|x) = 1,
where the first argument is empty since delX is a morphism with trivial output. copyX is
the stochastic matrix with entries
copyX(x1, x2|x0) :=
{
1 if x1 = x2 = x0,
0 otherwise.
While it is routine to verify the relevant equations from Definition 2.1 directly, a more
elegant and abstract argument is to use the fact that these equations are automatic in
FinSet, where the monoidal structure is cartesian, and then transfer to FinStoch by the
functoriality and symmetric monoidality of the inclusion FinSet → FinStoch. This works
for all conditions except (2.5), which is obvious.
It may be instructive to see explicitly why the monoidal structure is not cartesian. A
morphism ψ : I → X⊗Y is a joint distribution, whose composition with the two projections
X ⊗ Y → X and X ⊗ Y → Y gives the two marginal distributions I → X and I → Y .
Now if FinStoch was cartesian, the joints I → X ⊗ Y would have to be in bijection with
the pairs of marginals I → X and I → Y . Thus the fact that a joint distribution is
usually not uniquely specified by its marginals implies that FinStoch is not cartesian. More
generally, this is the reason for why cartesian monoidal categories are not interesting as
Markov categories.
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2.6. Example (See also [53] and [55, Section 8.4]). C may be FinSetMulti, the category
of finite sets with multivalued functions, defined in more detail as follows. A morphism
f : X → Y between sets X and Y is a function from X to the set of nonempty subsets of Y ,
or equivalently a matrix (f(y|x))x∈X,y∈Y with entries in {0, 1} such that for every x ∈ X
there is y ∈ Y with f(y|x) = 1, where again we use notation suggestive of conditional
probabilities as in Example 2.5. We think of the statement f(y|x) = 1 as saying that the
output y is possible given the input x, without specifying a further quantification of this
possibility, while f(y|x) = 0 states that the output y is impossible on input x. The extra
condition is then that for every input, at least one output is possible. It is in this sense
that we are dealing with multivalued functions.
The definition of composition is then just the usual composition of relations: for f :
X → Y and g : Y → Z, we put (gf)(z|x) := 1 if and only if there is y ∈ Y such that
g(z|y) = 1 and f(y|x) = 1, meaning that an output z is possible for gf if and only if an
output y is possible for f such that the output z is possible for g on input y. Using the
convention 1 + 1 := 1, this composition operation again takes the form of the Chapman–
Kolmogorov equation (2.8). The tensor product of morphisms is also as in (2.9), making
an output xy possible on input ab if x is possible for f on a and y is possible for g on b.
The comonoid morphisms del and copy take the exact same form as in FinStoch.
Although FinSetMulti looks like an interesting example for the concepts and results
developed in the rest of this paper, we will leave its more detailed investigation in our
context to future work.
2.7. Remark. Given morphisms f : X → Y and g : X → Z in a Markov category, we can
form a morphism X → Y ⊗ Z given by
f g
(2.10)
It is not hard to see that this equips the coslice category X/C with a monoidal structure,
where the monoidal unit is given by delX . This hints at a possible relation between Markov
categories and monoidal fibrations [106] by virtue of equipping the domain fibration dom :
C→ → C with a monoidal structure, and possibly hints at an equivalent but more abstract
definition of Markov categories. For a more “pedestrian” definition of a categorical structure
very similar to Markov categories based on this operation, see [55, Definition 1].
In categories of Markov kernels like FinStoch, the monoidal structure on the coslices
X/C is closely related to conditional products of probability distributions, which we will
investigate in Definition 12.8.
2.8. Notation. Although we will do this only with explicit mention, it can sometimes
be convenient to use notation like “f(x, y|a, b)” to indicate codomain and codomain of
a morphism f : A ⊗ B → X ⊗ Y in a general Markov category. This generalizes the
usual notation for FinStoch from Example 2.5. We can then use the Chapman–Kolmogorov
equation in the form (2.8) as a general formal notation for composition of morphisms,
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irrespectively of whether such composition involves any sort of summation in the category
under consideration. We can similarly use (2.9) as a general formal notation for the tensor
product of morphisms.
Given a morphism f : A→ X ⊗Y , composing with delX ⊗ id : X ⊗Y → Y implements
marginalization over the first variable. Just as we can denote the original morphism by
f(x, y|a), we can simply write f(y|a) for this marginal, and likewise for the similarly defined
other marginal f(x|a). In line with our formal probability notation, the defining equation
of marginalization
f(y|a) =
∑
x
f(x, y|a)
thereby acquires a completely formal meaning valid in any Markov category, where the
sum over x corresponds to the composition in (delX ⊗ id) ◦ f . The comonoid maps delX
and copyX do not appear explicitly in this notation: delX is denoted simply by the empty
symbol, indicating no dependence on x; while using copyX amounts to using the same
variable x in an expression twice. For example, the composition of the tensor product of
f : X → Y and g : X → Z with copyX as in (2.10) will be the morphism denoted simply
by f(y|x) g(z|x).
Despite the apparent utility and generality of this notation, we will leave a complete
formalization of it to future work, and will use it in this paper only occasionally and with
explicit mention. It may be interesting to note that it is similar to the abstract index
notation used in differential geometry and general relativity [114].
2.9. Notation. As is commonly done with monoid or comonoid structures in the context
of string diagrams, we also draw a bullet with three wires coming out
as a shorthand for either side of the associativity equation (2.2), to be interpreted as copying
with three outputs. And similarly for more than three outgoing wires, which is easily seen
to be unambiguous by repeated application of associativity.
3. Example: Kleisli categories of monoidal monads
In this section, we give a general construction of Markov categories as Kleisli categories
of symmetric monoidal affine monads. Subsequently, we will sketch the application of this
construction to the Giry monad and to the Radon monad. This implies that all results from
our later sections can be instantiated beyond the discrete case implemented by FinStoch,
namely in particular in the category of measurable spaces and measurable Markov kernels
(Section 4) and in the category of compact Hausdorff spaces and continuous Markov kernels
(Section 5). We expect that an analogous straightforward development will be possible also
in other cases, such as for the monad of Scott-continuous probability valuations on the
category of (all) topological spaces [62, Section 10] (see also [58, 43]).
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To begin the general construction, let D be a symmetric monoidal category. In the
examples of interest, D will typically be cartesian monoidal, but we do not need this as-
sumption. Further, let T : D → D be a monad with multiplication µ : TT → T and unit
η : 1 → T . It is a symmetric monoidal monad (e.g. [60, 104]) if it comes equipped with
morphisms
∇X,Y : TX ⊗ TY −→ T (X ⊗ Y )
natural in X and Y , which make T into a lax symmetric monoidal functor with unit
ηI : I → TI, and such that µ and η are monoidal transformations. Concretely, the latter
means that the diagrams
TTX ⊗ TTY T (TX ⊗ TY ) TT (X ⊗ Y )
TX ⊗ TY T (X ⊗ Y )
∇
µ⊗µ
T∇
µ
∇
(3.1)
X ⊗ Y
TX ⊗ TY T (X ⊗ Y )
η⊗η η
∇
(3.2)
must commute for all X,Y ∈ D. We then have the following standard result [60, Corol-
laire 7], [104, Proposition 1.2.2].
3.1. Proposition. Under these assumptions, the Kleisli category Kl(T ) becomes symmetric
monoidal, with:
⊲ the tensor product of objects being the one of D,
⊲ the tensor product of morphisms represented by f : A → TX and g : B → TY
being represented by the composite
A⊗B TX ⊗ TY T (X ⊗ Y ).
f⊗g ∇
Moreover, the standard inclusion functor D→ Kl(T ) is strict symmetric monoidal.
Thanks to the final statement, we can also transport comonoid structures along the
inclusion functor: if an object X ∈ D carries a distinguished comonoid structure, then so
does the corresponding object X ∈ Kl(T ). Moreover, if the monoidal unit I is terminal in
D and TI ∼= I (such a monad is also called affine), then I is terminal in Kl(T ) as well. Thus
we have the following:
3.2. Corollary. Let D be a Markov category and T a symmetric monoidal affine monad
on D. Then the Kleisli category Kl(T ) is again a Markov category in a canonical way.
Concretely, the comonoid multiplication of an object X ∈ Kl(T ) is represented by the
composite morphism
X X ⊗X T (X ⊗X).
copyX η
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In the case where D is cartesian monoidal, Corollary 3.2 has essentially been given by
Golubtsov [55, Theorem 2] and has also been hinted at by Cho and Jacobs [15, p. 6/7]. For
example, the submonad of normalized measures of a measure category in the sense of [103,
Definition 4.2] is one context in which the result applies.
3.3. Example. For D := FinSet considered as a cartesian monoidal category, let T be the
covariant nonempty powerset monad, whose underlying functor is TX := 2X \{∅}. Then T
comes equipped with a canonical symmetric monoidal structure ∇X,Y which takes a subset
of X and subset of Y and maps it to their cartesian product, which is a subset of X × Y .
Then Corollary 3.2 applies, and the resulting Kleisli category Kl(T ) is exactly the category
of finite sets and multivalued functions from Example 2.6.
4. Example: measurable spaces and measurable Markov kernels
In this section, we introduce Stoch, the most general category of measurable Markov
kernels between measurable spaces, as considered as a running example in the later sections,
as well as its more well-behaved subcategory BorelStoch consisting of standard Borel spaces.
Stoch contains as particular subcategories also many other Markov categories that may be
of interest to probabilists and statisticians; see e.g. Proposition 6.1. It has previously been
considered as a Markov category in [15, Example 2.5] and with minor variations prior to
that in [55, Section 8.1].
Roughly speaking, Stoch is the generalization of FinStoch from Example 2.5 beyond the
finite case, facilitating the treatment of Markov kernels between arbitrary measurable spaces.
This category can be considered to be the paradigmatic example of a Markov category
to which our formalism applies. Stoch can be obtained by applying the construction of
Section 3 to the Giry monad. But let us start with a brief outline of the illustrious history
of this category, or rather that part of its history that we know of.
It seems that the category Stoch was first considered by Lawvere [80] in 1962, before
Kleisli categories had been introduced in general [75]. Lawvere used these ideas to develop
aspects of a formal theory of stochastic processes, and seems to have envisioned synthetic
probability theory, as partly developed in this paper, more generally. In 1965, and appar-
ently independently of Lawvere’s work, the category Stoch was also considered by Cˇencov
as the category of statistical decision rules [11] in the context of information geometry, and
Cˇencov derived another description of this category [13, Theorem 5.2] reminiscent of what
we now know as the Kleisli category construction [70]. In 1966, a closely related category,
in fact containing Stoch as a full subcategory, was introduced by Morse and Sacksteder [93],
again apparently independently of Lawvere and Cˇencov. The construction of Stoch as a
Kleisli category was made explicit in 1982 by Giry [49, Section 4], using what we now call
the Giry monad based only on Lawvere’s ideas. A more contemporary expository account
can be found e.g. in Panangaden’s book on labelled Markov processes [95, Chapter 5]12.
We will follow his account by spelling out directly what the Kleisli category is.
12Panangaden works with subprobability measures, meaning measures normalized to ≤ 1. This does
not change anything substantially.
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To begin, let Meas be the category of measurable spaces (X,ΣX ) with measurable maps
as morphisms. Meas becomes symmetric monoidal upon equipping it with the usual product
of measurable spaces with product σ-algebras,
(X,ΣX)⊗ (Y,ΣY ) := (X × Y,ΣX ⊗ ΣY ),
The Giry monad functor P : Meas→ Meas assigns to every measurable space (X,ΣX) the
set of probability measures P (X,ΣX), equipped with the smallest σ-algebra which makes
the evaluation map
P (X,ΣX) −→ [0, 1], µ 7−→ µ(S)
measurable for every S ∈ ΣX . It acts on measurable maps by taking every probability
measure to its pushforward, which is easily seen to be a measurable operation itself.
We omit the construction of the unit and the multiplication of the Giry monad, referring
to [49, 2] for the details. Instead, we spell out directly what the Kleisli category Stoch :=
Kl(P ) looks like. The objects are again measurable spaces. A morphism (X,ΣX )→ (Y,ΣY )
is given by a map
f : ΣY ×X −→ [0, 1], (S, x) 7−→ f(S|x),
having the property that every f(−|x) : ΣY → [0, 1] is a probability measure, and such
that f(S|−) : X → [0, 1] is measurable for every S ∈ ΣY . The vertical bar reminds
us that we think of f as a specification of probability measures conditional on any given
x ∈ X. Composition with an analogous g : ΣZ × Y → [0, 1] is given by a version of the
Chapman–Kolmogorov equation (2.8),
g ◦ f : ΣZ ×X −→ [0, 1], (g ◦ f)(T |x) :=
∫
y∈Y
g(T |y) f(dy|x). (4.1)
Here, the integral exists since g(T |−) is measurable by assumption, and trivially bounded
since it is [0, 1]-valued. The σ-additivity in T follows from the σ-additivity of g(−|y) by
the dominated convergence theorem. The measurability in x for fixed T holds by the mea-
surability assumption on f whenever g is a simple function; the definition of the Lebesgue
integral then implies the general case, using the fact that the limit of a sequence of mea-
surable functions is again measurable. For the proof that this indeed gives a category, see
e.g. [95, Proposition 5.2]. Identity morphisms are given by
idX(S|x) =
{
1 if x ∈ S,
0 otherwise.
In order to make Stoch = Kl(P ) into a Markov category [15, Example 2.5], we use Corol-
lary 3.2 and make P into a symmetric monoidal monad via the maps
P (X,ΣX)⊗ P (Y,ΣY ) −→ P ((X,ΣX)⊗ (Y,ΣY )), (µ, ν) 7−→ µ⊗ ν. (4.2)
As usual in categorical probability, these maps implement the formation of product measures
µ⊗ ν [42].
4.1. Lemma. These maps make the Giry monad into an affine symmetric monoidal monad.
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Proof. It is clear that the Giry monad is affine. It is also straightforward to check that
the maps (4.2) are natural in X and Y , as well as that all the equations hold that make P
into a symmetric monoidal monad. The only problem is that it is not so clear whether (4.2)
is a morphism of Meas in the first place, i.e. whether it is measurable. We now focus on
proving this.
Since the σ-algebra on P ((X,ΣX) ⊗ (Y,ΣY )) is the smallest one which makes the
evaluation map on every S ∈ ΣX⊗ΣY measurable, it is enough to show that the composite
P (X,ΣX)⊗ P (Y,ΣY ) P ((X,ΣX )⊗ (Y,ΣY )) [0, 1]
evS
is jointly measurable for each fixed S. Concretely, this map is given by
P (X,ΣX)⊗ P (Y,ΣY ) −→ [0, 1], (µ, ν) 7−→ (µ⊗ ν)(S).
We prove that it is measurable using a standard application of the π-λ-theorem. Namely,
consider the collection of all measurable S which make this map measurable. Since limits of
pointwise convergent sequences of measurable maps are again measurable, this set system
is closed under countable disjoint unions; and it is clearly closed under complements, so
that we have a λ-system. On the other hand, ΣX ⊗ΣY is itself the σ-algebra generated by
the rectangle sets T ×U with T ∈ ΣX and U ∈ ΣY , which itself form a π-system. Thus by
the π-λ-theorem, it is now enough to prove the claim in the case S = T × U , i.e. to show
that the map
P (X,ΣX)⊗ P (Y,ΣY ) −→ [0, 1], (µ, ν) 7−→ µ(T )ν(U)
is measurable for every T ∈ ΣX and U ∈ ΣY . But now this is because this map is equal to
the composite
P (X,ΣX)⊗ P (Y,ΣY ) [0, 1] ⊗ [0, 1] [0, 1] ,
evT⊗evU · (4.3)
where the second map is just multiplication, which is clearly measurable. 
Concretely, the comonoid maps in Stoch are given by
copy(X,ΣX) : (ΣX ⊗ ΣX)×X −→ [0, 1], (S × T, x) 7−→
{
1 if x ∈ A ∩B,
0 otherwise.
for any generating rectangle A × B in the product σ-algebra. Indeed this corresponds to
assigning to every x ∈ X the measure δx,x on X ×X.
Here is an observation which we will frequently use when instantiating our definitions
and results in Stoch:
4.2. Lemma. Two morphisms f, g : A→ X1 ⊗ . . .⊗Xn in Stoch are equal if and only if
f(S1 × . . .× Sn|a) = g(S1 × . . .× Sn|a)
for all a ∈ A and Si ∈ ΣXi.
Proof. Use the fact that the cylinder sets S1×. . .×Sn form a π-system which generates
the product σ-algebra ΣX1 ⊗ . . .⊗ ΣXn , and apply the π-λ-theorem. 
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Although we will consider measure-theoretic probability to take place in Stoch in the
rest of this paper, there is evidence that Stoch is not the only or even the best Markov
category for this purpose; see Examples 10.4 and 11.18 for some of its counterintuitive and
perhaps undesirable features. However, its full subcategory BorelStoch ⊆ Stoch, consisting
of all standard Borel spaces or equivalently all Polish spaces together with measurable maps
as morphisms, turns out to be much more well-behaved. Since the Giry monad restricts
to Polish spaces, BorelStoch also arises as a Kleisli category via Corollary 3.2. As far as
we are aware, the only thing left to be desired of BorelStoch is that the Kolmogorov exten-
sion theorem holds in this Markov category only with respect to countable products [44,
Example 3.6].
Finally, we present two other candidate categories which are of potential interest in
the context of measure-theoretic probability, based on two related definitions of morphisms
given by Sacksteder and Dawid, and which may relate to conditional expectations (see
also Conjecture 11.10). Readers who are less interested in these technical details may
proceed to Section 5 without any loss.
If (X,ΣX) is a measurable space, then a σ-ideal is a subcollection NX ⊆ ΣX closed
under countable unions and intersections with elements of ΣX . The idea is thatNX specifies
a collection of sets which are considered negligibly small. If (X,ΣX ,NX) and (Y,ΣY ,NY )
are two measurable spaces with σ-ideals, then their product is defined by
(X,ΣX ,NX)⊗ (Y,ΣY ,NY ) := (X × Y,ΣX ⊗ ΣY , (NX × ΣY ) ∨ (ΣX ×NY )),
where the indicated new σ-ideal is the one generated by all sets of the form S × T for
S ∈ NX and T ∈ ΣY or S ∈ ΣX and T ∈ NY . We would like this product to be the object
part of a monoidal structure in both of the categories which we define next, although we
have not yet been able to define a monoidal structure on the morphisms.
We will say that some property holds almost everywhere if the set of points where it
does not hold is in the specified σ-ideal.
4.3. Example. Following Sacksteder [102, Section 2], a statistical operation
(X,ΣX ,NX)→ (Y,ΣY ,NY ) is an equivalence class of maps
f : ΣY ×X −→ [0, 1], (S, y) 7−→ f(S|y),
which satisfy the following conditions:
(a) For given S ∈ ΣY , the value f(S|x) may not be defined for every x, but is defined
almost everywhere;
(b) f(Y |x) = 1 for almost every x;
(c) Given a sequence of disjoint sets (Sn)n∈N in ΣX , we have f (
⋃
n Sn|x) =
∑
n f(Sn|x)
for almost every x;
(d) For every S ∈ NY , we have f(S|x) = 0 for almost every x.
Although this does not seem to have been considered by Sacksteder, it is natural for two
such maps f1 and f2 to be considered equivalent, f1 ∼ f2, if for every S ∈ ΣY the equation
f1(S|x) = f2(S|x) holds for almost every x.
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We define composition of such statistical operations using the already familiar
Chapman–Kolmogorov equation (4.1). Some straightforward measure-theoretic arguments
show that this integral indeed makes sense, that the resulting composite again satisfies
properties (a) to (d), and that this composition operation respects the equivalence. Since
the associativity of composition and the existence of identities are obvious, we can define
the category of statistical operations in Sacksteder’s sense, using equivalence classes of
statistical operations as morphisms.
In order to make this into a monoidal category, for every f : A→ X and g : B → Y we
would like to define their tensor product f ⊗ g : A⊗B → X ⊗ Y . On rectangles S × T for
S ∈ ΣX and T ∈ ΣY , this tensor product should be a new statistical operation satisfying
(f ⊗ g)(S × T |a, b) := f(S|a) g(T |b)
whenever the right-hand side is defined. However, since neither f(−|a) nor g(−|b) is σ-
additive in general, it is not clear to us whether this definition can be extended in any
meaningful way from measurable rectangles to the product σ-algebra. In other words, it is
not clear to us whether Sacksteder’s category of statistical operations can be made into a
symmetric monoidal category, let alone into a Markov category.
For (X,ΣX ,NX) a measurable space equipped with a σ-ideal, we write L
∞(X,ΣX ,NX),
or more concisely L∞(X), for the set of equivalence classes of bounded measurable functions
f : X → R, where f1 ∼ f2 if and only if f1(x) = f2(x) for almost every x. Declaring f ≥ 0
to hold if f(x) ≥ 0 for almost all x makes L∞(X) into an ordered vector space.
4.4. Example. Following Dawid [25, Section 3], a statistical operation (X,ΣX ,NX) →
(Y,ΣY ,NY ) is a map
F : L∞(Y )→ L∞(X)
having the following properties:
(a) F is R-linear;
(b) If g ≥ 0 for g ∈ L∞(Y ), then also F (g) ≥ 0 in L∞(X);
(c) F (1) = 1;
(d) If (gn)n∈N is a monotonically increasing sequence in L
∞(Y ) whose supremum exists
in L∞(Y ), then F (supn gn) = supn F (gn).
The idea is that F encodes the operation of pulling back a random variable along the
statistical operation. It is clear that these statistical operations can be composed, resulting
in the category of statistical operations in Dawid’s sense.
As in the previous example, we run into a problem upon trying to define the tensor
product of morphisms. If F : L∞(X) → L∞(A) and G : L∞(Y ) → L∞(B) are two
operators representing statistical operations A→ X and B → Y , then their tensor product
F ⊗G : L∞(A×B)→ L∞(X × Y ) should be an operator which satisfies
(F ⊗G)(f ⊗ g) := F (f)G(g)
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for all f ∈ L∞(X) and g ∈ L∞(Y ), where f ⊗ g ∈ L∞(X × Y ) is the product function
given by (f ⊗ g)(x, y) := f(x)g(y), and similarly for the right-hand side13. Upon trying
to extend this definition to all h ∈ L∞(X × Y ), we run into the problem that h may not
have a representative as the supremum of an increasing sequence of functions of the form∑n
i=1 fi ⊗ gi. Hence we again do not know whether this category of statistical operations
can be made into a symmetric monoidal category, let alone into a Markov category.
A possible way around this problem may be to restrict attention to those measurable
spaces equipped with σ-ideals (X,ΣX ,NX) which are such that ΣX/NX is a complete
Boolean algebra, and then strengthen condition (d) by replacing sequences by arbitrary
directed sets (Scott continuity). Then it would be enough to write every h ∈ L∞(X × Y )
as the directed supremum of a set of functions of the form
∑n
i=1 fi ⊗ gi.
Due to the problems with the definition of the tensor product of morphisms in the
previous two examples, we have not yet been able to instantiate the definitions and results
of Sections 10 to 16 in these cases. We also do not know whether either of these categories
arises as a Kleisli category via Corollary 3.2, nor do we know if and how these two categories
are related.
5. Example: compact Hausdorff spaces and continuous Markov kernels
In measure theory, it is often useful to work with probability measures on Borel σ-
algebras of suitable topological spaces. We here investigate one particularly clean way to
do so, based on the Radon monad. It involves CHaus, the category of compact Hausdorff
spaces and continuous maps, as perhaps the simplest nontrivial category of not necessarily
finite topological spaces. We equip it with the cartesian monoidal structure.
In more detail, the Radon monad R : CHaus→ CHaus, as introduced by S´wirszcz [112],
and studied further by Furber and Jacobs [47, 46], is the canonical probability monad on
compact Hausdorff spaces. Its underlying functor assigns to every X ∈ CHaus the set of
Radon probability measures on X, equipped with the coarsest topology which makes the
integration maps
RX −→ R, µ 7−→
∫
f dµ
continuous for every continuous f : X → R. As shown in [47], the Kleisli category Kl(R) is
opposite equivalent to the category of unital commutative C*-algebras with positive unital
linear maps as the morphisms.
Concretely, a morphism from X to Y in Kl(R) is represented by a continuous map
f : X → RY , and composition is again given by the Chapman–Kolmogorov equation in
the form (4.1). In order to show that Kl(R) is also a Markov category, by Corollary 3.2 it
is enough to equip R with the structure of a symmetric monoidal monad. We again want
to do this by taking product measures,
RX ×RY −→ R(X × Y ), (µ, ν) 7−→ µ⊗ ν, (5.1)
13It is easy to see that the product f⊗g ∈ L∞(X×Y ) does not depend on the choice of representatives.
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but we now run into the problem that the Borel σ-algebra on X ⊗ Y is generally much
larger than the product of the Borel σ-algebras. We therefore define the product measure
µ⊗ ν via the Riesz representation theorem by putting∫
X×Y
f d(µ ⊗ ν) :=
∫
X
∫
Y
f dµ dν, (5.2)
leaving the necessary verifications of linearity and positivity to the reader. We now note
that:
5.1. Lemma. These maps equip R with the structure of a symmetric monoidal monad.
Proof. As in the proof of Lemma 4.1, the nontrivial part is to show that (5.1) is
actually a morphism, i.e. that it is continuous, and our argument will be structurally similar.
To see this, it is enough to show that for any continuous f : X×Y → R, the composite
RX ×RY R(X × Y ) R
∫
f d(−)
is continuous, which is by definition given by
(µ, ν) 7−→
∫
X
∫
Y
f dµ dν.
If f is of the form f(x, y) = g(x)h(y) for continuous g : X → R and h : Y → R, then it is
easy to see that this holds by an argument analogous to the one around (4.3). Moreover,
the continuity clearly also holds for any linear combination of such functions; and since
these linear combinations are also closed under multiplication and clearly separate points,
the Stone–Weierstraß theorem implies that they are dense with respect to the supremum
norm.
Now let an arbitrary f and ε > 0 be given, and suppose that we want to find a
neighbourhood U of (µ, ν) in RX ×RY such that
∣∣∫
X
∫
Y
f dµ′ dν ′ −
∫
X
∫
Y
f dµ dν
∣∣ < ε for
all (µ′, ν ′) ∈ U . We first choose an approximation ‖f −
∑n
i=1 gi ⊗ hi‖∞ < ε/3 for suitable
n ∈ N and continuous gi : X → R and hi : Y → R, which is possible by the previous
paragraph. We next choose a neighbourhood U such that the desired inequality holds for
every gi⊗hi in place of f , and with quality of approximation ε/3n in place of ε. This gives,
for every (µ′, ν ′) ∈ U ,∣∣∣∣
∫
X
∫
Y
f dµ′ dν ′ −
∫
X
∫
Y
f dµ dν
∣∣∣∣
≤
∣∣∣∣∣
∫
X
∫
Y
(
f −
n∑
i=1
gi ⊗ hi
)
dµ′ dν ′
∣∣∣∣∣
+
∣∣∣∣∣
n∑
i=1
∫
X
∫
Y
(gi ⊗ hi) dµ
′ dν ′ −
n∑
i=1
∫
X
∫
Y
(gi ⊗ hi) dµ dν
∣∣∣∣∣
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+
∣∣∣∣∣
∫
X
∫
Y
(
f −
n∑
i=1
gi ⊗ hi
)
dµ dν
∣∣∣∣∣
≤ ε/3 + n · ε/3n + ε/3 = ε,
as was to be shown. 
We therefore have that Kl(R) is a Markov category per Corollary 3.2. The copy maps
are again represented by x 7→ δ(x,x).
6. Example: Gaussian probability theory
We now consider a Markov category describing Gaussian probability theory. This in-
volves formulas for the composition of Gaussian conditionals reproducing those of Lauritzen
and Jensen [79, Section 4.4]. As our previous two examples, it also has the flavour of a
Kleisli category, although we conjecture that it does not actually arise in that way. A sim-
ilar category was also considered by Golubtsov in [51, § 6] and [55, Section 8.2], who in
addition claimed to have proven that it is not a Kleisli category.
So let Gauss be the monoidal category whose monoid of objects is (N,+), and whose
morphisms n → m are tuples (M,C, s) with M ∈ Rm×n, C ∈ Rm×m positive semidefinite,
and s ∈ Rm; we think of this data as defining the conditional distribution of a random
variable Y ∈ Rm in terms of X ∈ Rn as
Y := MX + ξ, (6.1)
where ξ is Gaussian noise independent of X with mean E[ξ] := s and covariance matrix
Var[ξ] = E[ξξT ]−E[ξ]E[ξ]T = E[(ξ − s)(ξ − s)T ] := C.
If C is invertible, then the distribution of Y has a density with respect to the Lebesgue
measure on Rm which is given by
1√
(2π)mdet(C)
exp
(
−
1
2
(y −Mx− s)TC−1(y −Mx− s)
)
.
Before formally defining the composition of two morphisms
(M,C, s) : ℓ→ m, (N,D, t) : m→ n,
let us consider what it should represent. If Y = MX + ξ and Z = NY + η, then we get
Z = NMX +Nξ + η.
When composing two morphisms in a category of Markov kernels, we assume that the noise
added in each of them is independent of the other. Hence we expect
E[Nξ + η] = N E[ξ] +E[η] = Ns+ t,
and
Var[Nξ + η] = N Var[ξ]NT +Var[η] = NCNT +D.
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Therefore what we want to define is the composition
(N,D, t) ◦ (M,C, s) := (NM,NCNT +D,Ns+ t),
where it is straightforward to check that this is indeed associative and has the obvious
identity morphisms (1n, 0, 0). This composition operation is our version of the “direct
combination” equations given at [79, Section 4.4], specialized to case where no discrete
variables are present14. The tensor product of morphisms should correspond to acting on
two random variables at the same time. This means that we want to take direct sums of
all the data describing two arbitrary morphisms,
(M,C, s) ⊗ (N,D, t) := (M ⊕N,C ⊕D, s⊕ t),
since for independent random variables ξ ∈ Rm and η ∈ Rn, the expectation and variance
of (ξ, η) ∈ Rm+n are given by
E[(ξ, η)] = (E[ξ],E[η]), Var[(ξ, η)] =
(
Var[ξ] 0
0 Var[η]
)
.
It is also straightforward to check that this indeed defines a (strict) symmetric monoidal
category with the obvious symmetry isomorphisms. It may be interesting to note that
forgetting the covariance matrix of every morphism, (M,C, s) 7→ (M,s), implements a
strong monoidal functor from Gauss to the category of affine maps between Euclidean
spaces.
Since the only morphism n → 0 is the trivial one (0, 0, 0), the monoidal unit 0 ∈ N is
terminal, so that Gauss is indeed semicartesian. Moreover, every object n has a canonical
comultiplication given by
copyn :=
((
1n
1n
)
, 0, 0
)
,
which simply amounts to copying the value of a variableX ∈ Rn, resulting in (X,X) ∈ Rn+n.
The necessary requirements to be a Markov category are again straightforward to check.
We briefly investigate the relation between Gauss and Stoch. Unfortunately this is
somewhat interdependent with the upcoming Definition 10.14, since the following statement
involves the notion of Markov functor introduced there.
6.1. Proposition. There is a faithful Markov functor Gauss→ Stoch which takes n 7→ Rn,
where Rn carries the Borel σ-algebra.
Proof. We have already described how to interpret a morphism (M,C, s) : n→ m as a
Markov kernel taking an Rn-valued variable to an Rm-valued variable. It is straightforward
to verify that this defines a Markov functor Gauss→ Stoch, and that this functor is faithful.

6.2. Remark. As pointed out to us by Sam Staton, another Markov category with a
similar flavour and significance for probability theory has been considered in [109]. In more
explicit categorical terms, the objects are lists of natural numbers (n1, . . . , nk), representing
14It should not be difficult to combine FinStoch and Gauss into one Markov category which models
both discrete variables and Gaussian ones as in [79], but we have not yet done so.
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a disjoint union of measurable spaces [0, 1]n1 + . . . + [0, 1]nk , and the morphisms are those
Markov kernels that are definable just using beta and Bernoulli distributions. The paper
[109] then gives a description of this category in purely syntactic terms; for example, the
comultiplications copy(n) : [0, 1]
n → [0, 1]2n are given syntactically by
(p1, . . . , pn) | x : 2n ⊢ x(p1, . . . , pn, p1, . . . , pn).
7. Example: diagram categories and stochastic processes
In this section and the subsequent two, we present classes of examples of Markov cate-
gories arising from more general categorical constructions. Unfortunately, the construction
of this section already requires the notion of deterministic morphism from Definition 10.1
and the subcategory of deterministic morphisms Cdet ⊆ C from Remark 10.13.
Let C be a Markov category and D an arbitrary small category. We then introduce
another Markov category Fun(D,C). Its objects are defined to be functors D→ Cdet, which
we think of as diagrams with shape D of deterministic morphisms in C, and its morphisms
are natural transformations between these functors (with not necessarily deterministic com-
ponents). We use notation X = (Xd)d∈D for such functors, emphasizing their interpretation
as diagrams.
7.1. Proposition. Under these assumptions, Fun(D,C) is again a Markov category with
respect to the pointwise monoidal structure: for X,Y ∈ Fun(D,C), we put
(X ⊗ Y )d := Xd ⊗ Yd,
with the obvious action on morphisms of D, and similarly for the tensor product of mor-
phisms. The comultiplications are also defined pointwise,
(copyX)d := copyXd : Xd −→ Xd ⊗Xd. (7.1)
The proof is straightforward; the assumption that all morphisms in the diagrams (Xd)
are deterministic is required in order to make the comultiplications (7.1) into natural trans-
formations.
As an interesting and highly relevant example, we now illustrate how Proposition 7.1 lets
us instantiate the theory of Markov categories in the context of stochastic processes. Here,
we take D := (Z,≥), the category whose objects are integers, with exactly one morphism
n→ m if and only if n ≥ m and no morphism otherwise. For example with C = BorelStoch,
the functors D→ Cdet can be identified with infinite diagrams of measurable spaces
. . . Xn+1 Xn Xn−1 . . .
where all the maps involved are measurable functions (Example 10.5). We think of each
component Xn as the space of joint values of a stochastic process over all times t ≤ n,
where the map Xn+1 → Xn amounts to forgetting the value of the process at time n+1. A
morphism I → X in Fun(D,C) then assigns a probability measure to each of the measurable
spaces Xn in such a way that the projections Xn+1 → Xn are measure-preserving; thus
such a morphism exactly turns X into a stochastic process. More generally, a morphism
f : A → X may be interpreted as a stochastic process with control: An is the space of
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values of control parameters over all times t ≤ n, and the component fn : An → Xn assigns
a joint distribution over all values of the stochastic process as a function of these control
parameters. The required commutativity of the diagram
An+1 An
Xn+1 Xn
fn+1 fn
then ensures that these joint distributions are compatible in exactly the way that one would
expect: given the control parameters up to time n+1, the marginal of the associated joint
distribution up to time n coincides with the joint distribution associated to the control
parameters up to time n.
It therefore follows that all of our definitions and results can be applied at the level of
stochastic processes15. For example, the definition of statistic from Definition 14.2 amounts
to the following: a statistic consists of another sequence of spaces (Tn)n∈Z together with a
sequence of deterministic maps sn : Xn → Tn such that the diagrams
Xn+1 Xn
Tn+1 Tn
sn+1 sn
commute. This states that for every given value of Xn, the values of the statistic Tn can
be computed from the value of the process up to time n+ 1 by first computing the values
of the extended statistic Tn+1 and then projecting, or by marginalizing the process first to
time up to n and then applying the statistic there. Lauritzen’s notion of transitivity of a
sequence of statistics [77, Definition 2.1] is closely related.
Thus we can apply the upcoming results of Sections 14 to 16 to the relevant functor
category and thereby obtain results about this type of statistic living in time.
7.2. Remark. There are many conceivable variations on this basic idea. The extension
from discrete to continuous time is fairly obvious. We can also consider stationary stochastic
processes as follows. Let now D be the category consisting of one single object, such
that its monoid of endomorphisms is (Z,+). Then the objects of Fun(D,BorelStoch) are
measurable spaces equipped with an action of Z, which makes them into dynamical systems.
The morphisms I → X are then easily seen to be in canonical bijection with stationary
measures, turning X into a measure-preserving dynamical system.
7.3. Remark. The developments of this section are not sufficiently expressive to be turned
into a formal theory of stochastic processes, because the latter would clearly require more
structure: the theory of Markov categories itself does not provide any way to talk about
the temporal aspects. Nevertheless, we believe that it may be possible to develop a formal
theory of stochastic processes by equipping Markov categories with extra structure, such
15Golubtsov’s mention of “dynamical nondeterministic information transformers [. . . ] and information
interactions evolving in time” [55, p. 64] suggests that he may already have been aware of this possibility.
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as an action of a functor C → C which implements time translation, or more generally a
group action on C.
8. Example: hypergraph categories
Let D be a hypergraph category [10, 73, 35, 37]. This means in particular that each
object X ∈ D comes equipped with a distinguished comultiplication copyX : X → X ⊗X
and counit morphism delX : X → I satisfying (2.4). Now let C be the subcategory consisting
of all morphisms which preserve the counit. In other words, f : X → Y is in C if and only
if delY ◦ f = delX . Then it is not hard to see that C carries the structure of a Markov
category.
8.1. Example. A good example is FinRel, the category of finite sets and relations, with
its usual monoidal structure given by the cartesian product and the canonical hypergraph
structure where the distinguished relation Xn → Xm relates a tuple (x1, . . . , xn) to a tuple
(x′1, . . . , x
′
m) if and only if x1 = . . . = xn = x
′
1 = . . . = x
′
m, implementing both “copying” as
a morphism X → X ⊗X and “testing for equality” as a morphism X ⊗X → I.
Restricting FinRel to the counit-preserving morphisms recovers exactly FinSetMulti (Ex-
ample 2.6).
8.2. Example. A closely related example is the hypergraph category Mat(R) for a semiring
(R,+, ·). Its objects are finite sets, and morphisms X → Y are matrices (fxy)x∈X,y∈Y with
fxy ∈ R, which compose by matrix multiplication. The monoidal structure is given by
cartesian product of sets and tensor product of matrices. If R is the Boolean semiring
R = {0, 1} with 1 + 1 := 1, then Mat(R) ∼= FinRel, so that this generalizes the previous
example.
Restricting to the counit-preserving morphisms results in a Markov category, namely
the category of “stochastic matrices” with entries in R. In particular for R = R+, we obtain
the category of stochastic matrices, which is equivalent to FinStoch (Example 2.5). Taking
R := ([0, 1],max,min) or R := ([0, 1],max, ·) recovers Golubtsov’s two categories of fuzzy
information transformers [55, Section 8.5], modulo the minor difference that our objects
are merely finite instead of arbitrary sets.
While the idea of imposing normalization in this way by restricting to the subcategory
of counit-preserving morphisms is not new and can be done in somewhat greater generality
(see e.g. [15, Section 7]), we believe that applying this procedure in the particular case
of hypergraph categories, such as the ones of [35], has the potential to produce further
examples of Markov categories in which our results will have interesting instantiations.
9. Example: categories of commutative comonoids
Let D be a symmetric monoidal category, and let C be the category of commutative
comonoids in D with morphisms those maps which preserve the counits. Hence an object
in C is by definition a triple (X,µX , eX) with µX : X → X ⊗ X and eX : X → I in
D satisfying the usual equations, while a C-morphism (X,µX , eX) → (Y, µY , eY ) is a D-
morphism f : X → Y such that eY = eXf . The usual tensor product of commutative
30 TOBIAS FRITZ
comonoids makes C into a symmetric monoidal category, where the symmetry is also the
one inherited from D. Every object (X,µX , eX) ∈ C now has a canonical commutative
comonoid structure not only in D, but even in C, given by the structure maps copyX := µX
and delX := eX . We have therefore sketched the proof of:
9.1. Proposition. If D is a symmetric monoidal category, then the category of commutative
comonoids in D with counit-preserving morphisms is a Markov category.
One use of Markov categories of this type is that they can provide counterexamples to
plausible-sounding conjectures, as for example in Remark 10.10 and Example 11.33.
10. Deterministic morphisms and a strictification theorem
We now return to the development of the general theory, frequently illustrating it in
some of the previous examples.
The reader may have noticed that Definition 2.1 postulates the naturality of del but not
of copy, for which it would take the form (10.1). Indeed, the reason is that this naturality
does not hold in the examples of interest to us, such as FinStoch from Example 2.5, or more
generally Stoch, the example of measurable Markov kernels between measurable spaces from
Section 4. The simple intuitive reason is that applying a Markov kernel independently to
two copies of a variable is different than applying the map first and then copying. In fact,
those morphisms for which the naturality holds are of a very special kind:
10.1. Definition. A morphism f : X → Y in a Markov category is deterministic if it
respects the comultiplication,
f f
=
f
(10.1)
This definition goes back to the characterization of functions as comonoid-preserving
relations given by Carboni and Walters [9, Lemma 2.5] and has also been used in the present
form by Fong [34, Lemma 5.2]. Deterministic morphisms have also been investigated as
copyable morphisms in the program semantics literature [113, 45]. In the specific context
of Markov kernels, our definition may first have been used in [20, Section 3.3], although
there also are strong similarities with Golubtsov’s earlier work [55, Eq. (2)].
In terms of our notion of conditional independence to be introduced in Definition 12.12,
this can also be understood as saying that the morphisms on the right-hand side displays
the conditional independence Y ⊥ Y ||X. Intuitively, we can phrase this as saying that
the random variable f is independent of itself, which is a standard equivalent way to talk
about deterministic events.
We denote the collection of deterministic morphisms by Cdet ⊆ C. As we will show
in Remark 10.13, Cdet is a symmetric monoidal subcategory of C.
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10.2. Remark. The commutative comonoid axioms of Definition 2.1 imply that the struc-
ture maps delX : X → I and copyX : X → X ⊗X are themselves deterministic.
10.3. Example. It is easy to see that in FinStoch, the deterministic maps are exactly
the usual ones, i.e. those stochastic matrices f where each entry fxy is either 0 or 1. It
follows that the deterministic morphisms form a symmetric monoidal subcategory which is
precisely the image of the inclusion FinSet→ FinStoch.
10.4. Example. Let us consider deterministic morphisms in Stoch, the category of mea-
surable spaces and Markov kernels (Section 4). For f : (X,ΣX ) → (Y,ΣY ), the left-hand
side of the determinism equation is represented by the map
(ΣY ⊗ ΣY )×X −→ [0, 1], (S × T, x) 7−→ f(S|x)f(T |x),
where we have specified the map only on generating rectangles S × T ∈ (ΣY ⊗ΣY ), which
is enough. Similarly, the right-hand side of the determinism equation is
(ΣY ⊗ ΣY )×X −→ [0, 1], (S × T, x) 7−→ f(S ∩ T |x).
So if the left-hand side and right-hand side are equal, then we must have f(S|x)2 = f(S|x)
for all S ∈ ΣY , which implies that every measure f(−|x) : ΣY → [0, 1] is actually {0, 1}-
valued. Conversely, Lemma 4.2 and additivity of f in the first argument show that this is
enough. Hence the deterministic morphisms in Stoch are precisely those Markov kernels
which land in {0, 1}-valued measures.
In general, a {0, 1}-valued measure does not need to be a delta measure; a standard
example is given by the countable-cocountable σ-algebra on an uncountable set Y , with
a {0, 1}-valued measure which assigns measure 1 to precisely the cocountable sets. So
although the deterministic morphisms are again precisely those Markov kernels which do not
involve any randomness, the subcategory of deterministic morphisms does not coincide with
Meas, the category of measurable spaces: the induced functor fromMeas to the deterministic
morphisms in Stoch is not full. And it is not even faithful either, although for a more stupid
reason: if ΣY does not separate the points of Y , then there will be different measurable
maps 1 → Y whose induced delta measures ΣY → {0, 1} are the same. As is well-known,
both pathologies can be avoided by imposing suitable restrictions on the measurable spaces
involved. Namely if ΣY is countably generated and separates the points of Y , then the
deterministic morphisms (X,ΣX) → (Y,ΣY ) are exactly the measurable maps, as can be
seen as follows. The map y 7→ δy identifies the elements of Y with the {0, 1}-valued
probability measures ΣY → [0, 1] by [100, p. 14], and the measurability condition on
f(S|−) : X → [0, 1] for S ∈ ΣY then becomes precisely the requirement that
{x ∈ X | f(S|x) = 1} ∈ ΣX ,
which amounts to the condition that the representing map X → Y must be measurable.
Hence the functor from Meas to deterministic morphisms in Stoch is fully faithful on mor-
phisms into (Y,ΣY ) as soon as ΣY is countably generated and separating, but in general
neither full nor faithful. We take this as evidence for the hypothesis that Stoch is not actu-
ally the “best” Markov category for measure-theoretic probability. (See also Examples 4.3
and 4.4.)
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10.5. Example. The situation is much better in the full subcategory BorelStoch ⊆ Stoch.
Thinking of a standard Borel space as a Polish space, noting that every probability measure
on a Polish space has a support implies that a {0, 1}-valued measure is indeed a delta
measure. Furthermore using the fact that the relevant Borel σ-algebras separate points, it
follows that the subcategory of deterministic morphisms is isomorphic to the category of
standard Borel spaces and measurable maps.
10.6. Remark. Consider more generally the setting of Corollary 3.2. There, it is easy to
see that the image of every deterministic morphism in D is also deterministic in Kl(T ). But
as we have seen in Example 10.4, the functor D → Kl(T ) need not be faithful, and it may
also not be full on deterministic morphisms. In other words, deterministic morphisms and
morphisms of D must be carefully distinguished.
10.7. Example. In Gauss, a morphism (M,C, s) : m → n is deterministic if and only if
the morphism ((
1n
1n
)
, 0, 0
)
◦ (M,C, s) =
((
M
M
)
,
(
C C
C C
)
,
(
s
s
))
is equal to the morphism
((M,C, s) ⊗ (M,C, s)) ◦
((
1m
1m
)
, 0, 0
)
=
((
M
M
)
,
(
C 0
0 C
)
,
(
s
s
))
.
Therefore (M,C, s) is deterministic if and only if C = 0, which indeed means if and only if
there is no randomness involved.
10.8. Example. In a category of commutative comonoids and counit-preserving morphisms
(Proposition 9.1), the deterministic morphisms are precisely the comonoid homomorphisms.
Let us return to the general theory. Deterministic morphisms in a Markov category
have the following in common with epimorphisms in any category:
10.9. Lemma. Let f : X → Y and g : Y → Z. Then:
(a) If f and g are deterministic, then so is gf .
(b) If gf is deterministic and f is a deterministic epimorphism, then g is deterministic
as well.
(c) If f and g are inverse isomorphisms and if one of them is deterministic, then so
is the other.
Proof. We show (b), leaving the even simpler proofs of (a) and (c) to the reader. We
compute
g
f f
g g
=
f
=
g g
f
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and now use the epimorphism property to cancel f . 
We dedicate the remainder of this section to formal categorical considerations. These
address some important technical issues which turn out to be surprisingly subtle. Readers
who are primarily interested in our treatment of conditional independence and statistics
instead can safely move on to Section 11.
The following observation is the main reason for why categorical subtleties arise.
10.10. Remark. There are Markov categories C which contain isomorphisms that are not
deterministic.
We can build concrete examples of this phenomenon based on the construction of
Markov categories C as categories of comonoids in symmetric monoidal categories D via
Proposition 9.1. The idea is the same object X ∈ D may support two comonoid structures
with the same counit eX : X → I but different comultiplications
µX , µ
′
X : X → X ⊗X,
resulting in a non-deterministic isomorphism
idX : (X,µX , eX)→ (X,µ
′
X , eX).
Here, it may or may not be the case that the two comonoids (X,µX , eX) and (X,µ
′
X , eX)
are isomorphic in some other way.
More concretely, D may be the category of finite-dimensional vector spaces over a field
k equipped with the usual tensor product of vector spaces. Then since this D is monoidally
equivalent to its own opposite, we can identify C with the opposite of the category of finite-
dimensional commutative k-algebras together with k-linear unital maps. If we restrict to the
k-algebras of the form kn (with componentwise operations), then our D becomes equivalent
to the category of “stochastic matrices” with entries in k, where a stochastic matrix is
(fxy)x∈X,y∈Y ∈ k
X×Y with
∑
y fxy = 1 as in Example 2.5. Equivalently, this D is the full
subcategory of the Kleisli category of the k-affine space monad on Set with finite sets as
objects. But without the restriction to k-algebras of this form, the category is significantly
larger, and contains for example algebras like k[X]/〈X2〉. This algebra is isomorphic to k2
in C, even in a number of different ways, but none of these isomorphisms is deterministic
because k[X]/〈X2〉 and k2 are not isomorphic as k-algebras.
10.11. Remark. We expect that the remainder of this section will also apply, after some
straightforward modifications, in the context of hypergraph categories [73, 35, 37], and
perhaps more generally to symmetric monoidal categories supplied with extra structure [36].
10.12. Lemma. The subcategory of deterministic morphisms Cdet ⊆ C is closed under
tensor product and contain all structure maps, meaning the associators, unitors, del, copy,
and swap.
See the proof of [36, Theorem 3.12] for an independently obtained similar result in a
more general setup for symmetric monoidal categories with extra “bells and whistles”.
34 TOBIAS FRITZ
Proof. The first claim is a direct consequence of (2.4). That the structure maps are
deterministic is easiest to see for every delX and copyX (Remark 10.2). For swapX,Y :
X ⊗ Y → Y ⊗X, we only need (2.4) and the naturality of the symmetry isomorphisms,
Y X Y X
X Y X Y
=
Y X Y X
The unitors are deterministic thanks to (2.7) applied with one of the two tensor factors
being I together with copyI being equal to the unitor I
∼= I ⊗ I. Finally, the problem is
trickiest for an associator (X ⊗ Y ) ⊗ Z
∼=
−→ X ⊗ (Y ⊗ Z). For this case, we denote the
composite vertical isomorphism (X ⊗ Y ) ⊗ (X ⊗ Y ) −→ (X ⊗ X) ⊗ (Y ⊗ Y ) of (2.7) by
grX,Y . Writing “ ;” instead of “⊗” for brevity, we consider the diagram
(X;Y );Z ((X;Y );Z); ((X;Y );Z)
(X;Y );Z ((X;Y ); (X;Y ));Z ((X;Y ); (X;Y )); (Z;Z)
(X;Y );Z (X; (Y ;Y ));Z ((X;X); (Y ;Y ));Z ((X;X); (Y ;Y )); (Z;Z)
X; (Y ;Z) X; ((Y ;Y );Z) (X;X); ((Y ;Y );Z) (X;X); ((Y ;Y ); (Z;Z))
X; (Y ;Z) X; ((Y ;Y );Z) X; ((Y ;Y ); (Z;Z)) (X;X); ((Y ;Y ); (Z;Z))
X; (Y ;Z) X; ((Y ;Z); (Y ;Z)) (X;X); ((Y ;Z); (Y ;Z))
X; (Y ;Z) (X; (Y ;Z)); (X; (Y ;Z))
copy(X;Y );Z
gr(X;Y ),Z
copyX;Y ;id id;copyZ
grX,Y ;id grX,Y ;id
(id;copyY );id
∼=
(copyX ;id);id
∼= ∼=
id;copyZ
∼=
id;(copyY ;id) copyX ;id id;(id;copyZ)
(id;copyY );id id;(id;copyZ)
id;gr−1
Y,Z
copyX ;id
id;gr−1
Y,Z
id;copyY ;Z copyX ;id
grX;(Y ;Z)
copyX;(Y ;Z)
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Each square commutes either by standard properties of symmetric monoidal categories,
including naturality of the associator, or as an instance of (2.7). Note that the bottom
three rows of the diagram are somewhat similar to the top three. Commutativity of this
diagram establishes the claim: the left vertical composite is obviously just the associator,
while the right vertical composite is the tensor product of the associator with itself by the
coherence theorem for symmetric monoidal categories, where applying this requires one to
distinguish the two factors of X on the right, and likewise for Y and Z, noting that their
order is the same at the bottom as it is on top. 
10.13. Remark. Since we already know that the deterministic morphisms are closed under
composition and include all structure maps, Lemma 10.12 therefore concludes that they
form a symmetric monoidal subcategory Cdet ⊆ C. Using the well-known fact that having
a natural comonoid structure on every object of a symmetric monoidal category implies
that the monoidal structure is cartesian (e.g. [64]), we see that Cdet is cartesian monoidal.
We will make judicious use of this observation below. It provides the basis for relating our
Definition 2.1 to Golubtsov’s formulation in terms of cartesian monoidal structure [55].
Note also that every monoidal product X ⊗ Y in C, when equipped with the two
projections
idX ⊗ delY : X ⊗ Y −→ X, delX ⊗ idY : X ⊗ Y −→ Y,
always satisfies the existence part of the universal property of a product by (2.10). The
uniqueness part hinges on the naturality of copy.
10.14. Definition. The collection of Markov categories makes up a 2-category Markov,
where:
⊲ objects are Markov categories;
⊲ 1-morphisms F : C→ D are Markov functors, by which we mean strong symmetric
monoidal functors which preserve the comonoids in the sense that the diagram
FX
FX ⊗ FX F (X ⊗X)
copyFX F (copyX)
∼=
(10.2)
commutes for every X ∈ C, where the horizontal arrow is the relevant structure
morphism of F ;
⊲ 2-morphisms t : F ⇒ G for F,G : C → D are monoidal natural transformations
with deterministic components.
A Markov functor which is faithful is also called a Markov embedding.
For both 1-morphisms and 2-morphisms, one might also expect the obvious compat-
ibility conditions with the counits to be required. These hold automatically due to the
terminality of the monoidal unit, and we therefore do not spell them out. Another relevant
observation is that the monoidal structure isomorphisms FX ⊗ FY
∼=
−→ F (X ⊗ Y ) are
automatically deterministic [36, Theorem 4.6].
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10.15. Lemma. Let F : C → D be a comonoid functor. Then F takes deterministic
morphisms to deterministic morphisms, giving a functor Fdet : Cdet → Ddet. Morever, Fdet
preserves finite products.
Proof. Straightforward. 
We say that F : C → D is a comonoid equivalence if it is an equivalence in the 2-
category Markov. The following result provides a convenient way of recognizing comonoid
equivalences, analogous to the standard fact that a functor is an equivalence of categories
if and only if it is fully faithful and essentially surjective.
10.16. Proposition. A symmetric monoidal functor F : C→ D is a comonoid equivalence
if and only if it is an equivalence of categories, and for every object Y ∈ D there is X ∈ C
and an isomorphism i : Y
∼=
→ FX which is deterministic, meaning that the diagram
Y FX
Y ⊗ Y FX ⊗ FX
i
∼=
copyY copyFX
i⊗i
∼=
commutes.
Proof. If F is an equivalence in Markov with inverse equivalence G : D → C, then
we can take X := GY , and the square commutes because the given natural isomorphism
FG ∼= idD is required to have deterministic components.
Conversely, choose for every object Y ∈ D an object X ∈ C together with i : Y
∼=
→ FX
which makes the square commute. Then it is a standard fact that these choices determine
an equivalence g : D→ C sending every Y ∈ D to the corresponding X ∈ C, and being right
adjoint to F via ε : FG ∼= idD and η : idC ∼= GF [87, Theorem IV.4.1]. Moreover, G has
a unique monoidal structure which makes it into a monoidal equivalence weakly inverse to
F [101, 4.4.2.1]. Now the natural isomorphism ε : FG ∼= idD has deterministic components
by construction. We show that same holds true for η : idC ∼= GF . Since F is faithful, it is
enough to prove commutativity of the relevant diagrams after application of F . In other
words, we only need to show that
FX FGFX
FX ⊗ FX FGFX ⊗ FGFX
F (X ⊗X) F (GFX ⊗GFX)
copyFX
FηX
copyFGFX
∼=
FηX⊗FηX
∼=
F (ηX⊗ηX)
commutes for every X ∈ C. Since the lower square commutes by naturality, it remains to
be shown that FηX is deterministic. But this is because FηX is inverse to εFX by the
triangle identities for adjoints, and we already know that εFX is deterministic.
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We still need to prove that G preserves the comonoids. We first show this for objects
of the form FX ∈ D, where we have
GFX GFX X GFX
G(FX ⊗ FX) GF (X ⊗X) X ⊗X GFX ⊗GFX
G(copyFX) GF (copyX)
η−1
X
copyX
ηX
copyGFX
G(∼=) η
−1
X⊗X ηX⊗ηX
where the top composite is idGFX as desired, and the bottom composite is the desired
structure isomorphism G(FX ⊗FX) ∼= GFX ⊗GFX thanks to the monoidality of η. The
left square commutes since F is a comonoid functor, the middle square by naturality of
η−1, and the right one since ηX is deterministic. The general case reduces to this one via
i : Y
∼=
→ FX and the diagram
GY GFX GFX GY
G(Y ⊗ Y ) G(FX ⊗ FX) GFX ⊗GFX GY ⊗GY
G(copyY )
Gi
G(copyFX) copyGFX
G(i−1)
copyGY
G(i⊗i) ∼= G(i
−1)⊗G(i−1)
where the top composite is simply the desired idGY , and the bottom composite is the
desired structure isomorphism G(Y ⊗ Y ) ∼= GY ⊗GY . The left square is the G-image of a
commuting squares by the assumption that i is deterministic, the middle square commutes
as per the above, and the right square because G(i−1) is deterministic by virtue of being
equal to GεY , which is the inverse of the deterministic morphism ηGY . 
The following theorem is analogous to an existing strictification theorem for hypergraph
categories due to Fong and Spivak [37, Theorem 1.1], whereas our proof has the additional
feature that it uses Mac Lane’s strictification theorem as a mere black box. It has inspired
Fong and Spivak to prove a more general strictification theorem for symmetric monoidal
categories with extra structure [36, Proposition 3.24 and Corollary 4.9].
Let us say that a Markov category is strict if its underlying monoidal category is strict.
10.17. Theorem. Every Markov category is comonoid equivalent to a strict one.
Proof. Consider the subcategory of deterministic morphisms Cdet ⊆ C, which is carte-
sian monoidal, and choose a strict symmetric monoidal category C′det with a symmetric
monoidal equivalence Fdet : C
′
det
∼=
→ Cdet. Now let C
′ be the monoidal category having the
same objects as C′det, but hom-sets C
′(X,Y ) := C(FdetX,FdetY ). If we consider C
′
det to be
a subcategory of C′ via Fdet, and write F for the obvious functor C
′ → C, then we have a
diagram of categories
C′det Cdet
C′ C
⊆
Fdet
⊆
F
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which commutes on the nose. Since C′det is cartesian monoidal, C
′ inherits canonical
comonoids satisfying the compatibility with the monoidal structure of (2.7), and the
monoidal unit I ∈ C′ is terminal by construction. Hence C′ is also a Markov category.
Since Fdet is symmetric monoidal and F merely extends it to the non-deterministic
morphisms, also F comes equipped with a symmetric monoidal structure, and it is a sym-
metric monoidal equivalence by virtue of being an equivalence and symmetric monoidal.
The essential surjectivity criterion of Proposition 10.16 now holds because Fdet is an equiv-
alence. 
This result guarantees us that applying the graphical language for symmetric monoidal
categories [71], as we do throughout the paper, indeed gives results that apply to all Markov
categories (as the graphical language depicts only the strict case).
10.18. Remark (cf. [65, Proposition 4.3]). If C is a Markov category and X ∈ C, then
a version of the Eckmann–Hilton argument shows that X carries a unique deterministic
comonoid structure. For if we have any other deterministic comultiplication on X, drawn
as a white dot, then we get
= = =
where the second equation is by the determinism assumption as well as (2.4), and we have
used the assumption that I is terminal, which means that the two counits coincide.
This property is not particularly surprising, since the subcategory Cdet ⊆ C is cartesian
monoidal (Remark 10.13). So we mention this mainly as preparation for the stronger
observation made in the upcoming Remark 11.29.
10.19. Remark. The previous arguments indicate that it may be useful to think of the
subcategory Cdet ⊆ C as the primary object which specifies a Markov category, together with
some way of equipping this category with additional morphisms. This leads us to suspect
that there could be a simple alternative definition of Markov categories as categories with
finite products, modelling Cdet, equipped with a suitable kind of arrow [68], modelling C.
Similarly and essentially equivalently [68, Theorem 6.1], the inclusion functor Cdet → C can
also be seen as a commutative Freyd category [85]16. In fact, it may be possible to generalize
many of our methods and results to all semicartesian commutative Freyd categories. In
our language, this amounts to starting with a pair of categories (Cdet,C) where Cdet is
cartesian monoidal, C is symmetric semicartesian monoidal, and we are given a strong
monoidal functor Cdet → C, which in particular equips C with affine comonoids, where the
16This has been pointed out to us by Sam Staton.
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comultiplications are given as the C-images of the diagonals X → X ⊗X defined in Cdet.
In this setting, deterministic morphisms and stochastic morphisms live in two separate
categories, a setup proposed earlier by Golubtsov [55, Sections 2 and 3]17 with minor
variations. For cartesian monoidal D, the situation D → Kl(T ) described in Corollary 3.2
gives a paradigmatic example.
There are advantages and disadvantages to such an approach. The main advantage
is that one can work with the inclusion Meas → Stoch, and consider the deterministic
morphisms to be the morphisms of Meas, thereby getting around the problem described in
Example 10.4. A seemingly greater disadvantage is that one can no longer state and prove
results such as Proposition 13.15, stating that retracts are almost surely deterministic.
11. Further candidate axioms for Markov categories
Traditionally, probability and statistics take place in some souped-up version of
FinStoch, namely some suitable category of measurable spaces and Markov kernels (Sec-
tions 4 and 5). Such a category has many additional properties which sometimes play an
important role. In this section, we describe some of these properties, thinking of them as
potential additional axioms that can make a Markov category into a category that “looks
more like” a category of Markov kernels. However, our present investigations seem too
preliminary to settle on any particular set of axioms, so that we will not make a definite
choice. None of these axioms will play a central role in the rest of this paper, although we
will have occasional use for them in the upcoming sections (where we make explicit mention
when one of them is assumed).
Conditionals and conditioning. The first special property of probability theory is
the possibility to do conditioning. The standard properties of conditional distributions are
captured in the following definition, which is originally due to Golubtsov [55, Section 7.1]
and has been rediscovered more recently by Cho and Jacobs [15, Section 3], who called it
admitting disintegration.
11.1. Definition. Let C be a Markov category. We say that C has conditional distributions
if for every morphism ψ : I → X ⊗ Y , there is ψ|X : X → Y such that
ψ =
ψ
ψ|X
X Y
X Y
(11.1)
17See also Golubtsov’s [52, Definition 7] for where the same definition has already been put forward
earlier in the context of a specific category.
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In terms of Notation 2.8, this equation looks exactly like the familiar defining equation
of conditional distributions in the discrete case, which is the chain rule
ψ(x, y) = ψ|X(y|x)ψ(x). (11.2)
The difference is that Notation 2.8 lets us interpret this equation not only in the discrete case,
but in any Markov category, including in categories like Stoch or BorelStoch concerned with
measure-theoretic probability. Note that in this case, this equation is not an equation about
densities, and x and y are not elements of the measurable spaces involved, but rather mere
formal variables which encode the wiring structure of (11.1) in symbolic form. The correct
interpretation of this equation in measure-theoretic probability is the upcoming (11.3).
11.2. Example. In FinStoch, we can interpret the formal variables x and y as actual
elements. It follows that FinStoch has conditional distributions given by
ψ|X(y|x) =
ψ(x, y)
ψ(x)
,
in case that x ∈ X is such that ψ(x) > 0, which is the usual defining equation for condi-
tional probabilities. In case that ψ(x) = 0, we choose any set of values ψ|X(y|x) ∈ [0, 1]
satisfying the required normalization condition
∑
y ψ|X(y|x) = 1. Now indeed the relevant
equation (11.2) holds by definition, and it can be interpreted either formally in the sense of
Notation 2.8 as a different way of writing (11.4), or now equivalently as an actual equation
involving real numbers and multiplication.
11.3. Example. What are conditional distributions in Stoch? For a given probability
measure ψ on a product σ-algebra ΣX ⊗ΣY , a conditional distribution is a Markov kernel
ψ|X : (X,ΣX)→ (Y,ΣY ) satisfying the equation
ψ(S × T ) =
∫
x∈S
ψ|X(T |x)ψ(dx) (11.3)
for all S ∈ ΣX and T ∈ ΣY , since this is enough to prove the equation (11.1) by Lemma 4.2.
Such a ψ|X is sometimes called a product regular conditional probability, and is known to
exist whenever (Y,ΣY ) is standard Borel, but not in general [32]. Thus BorelStoch has
conditional distributions, but Stoch does not.
A more commonly studied concept in probability and statistics are regular conditional
distributions, defined as follows [76, Definition 7.28]. Let (W,ΣW , ψ) be a probability space
and f : (W,ΣW )→ (Z,ΣZ) a measurable function (or “random variable”) taking values in
some other measurable space (Z,ΣZ). Suppose that F ⊆ ΣW is a sub-σ-algebra. Then
the identity map i : (W,ΣW )→ (W,F) is measurable, and therefore also a (deterministic)
morphism in Stoch. Then we can consider the joint probability measure on (W,F) and
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(Z,ΣZ) given by
ψ
fi
(W,F) (Z,ΣZ)
A regular conditional distribution in the traditional sense is then the same as a conditional
distribution in our sense, instantiated in Stoch on this particular joint distribution. Again,
it is a standard fact that such regular conditional distributions exist whenever (Z,ΣZ) is
standard Borel [76, Theorem 8.37], [40, 452N], but not in general [7, Exercise 33.13].
Conversely, a generic conditional distribution in our sense can be constructed as a
regular conditional probability by putting
W := X × Y, Z := Y,
with the obvious σ-algebras, as well as taking f to be the projection X × Y → Y and F
to be given by the sub-σ-algebra ΣX ⊆ ΣX ⊗ ΣY . Thus conditional distributions in our
sense and regular conditional distributions in the usual sense are mutual special cases of
each other.
In conclusion, Stoch does not have conditional distributions in general, but BorelStoch
does. Furthermore, the existence of conditional distributions in our sense is equivalent to
the existence of regular conditional distributions in the usual sense.
11.4. Example. The Kleisli category of the Radon monad Kl(R) (Section 5) does not have
conditional distributions, for the simple reason that requiring the conditional X → Y to
be represented by a continuous function X → RY is too much to ask for: conditionals are
rarely continuous.
However, Definition 11.1 is not yet the definition that seems most natural to us, and
we will next present a more general definition which turns out to be more useful for our
purposes. For motivation, consider a morphism ψ : I → X ⊗ Y ⊗ Z, which we may think
of as a joint distribution of three random variables. Then it ought to be possible to obtain
a conditional ψ|X⊗Y : X ⊗ Y → Z by first conditioning on X and then conditioning on Y .
However, the second step is not a form of conditioning in the sense of Definition 11.1, since
only conditioning on morphisms with domain I is allowed, while we would like to condition
ψ|X : X → Y ⊗Z on Y . Using the following improved definition, we will prove this iterated
conditioning property in Lemma 11.11.
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11.5. Definition. Let C be a Markov category. We say that C has conditionals if for every
morphism f : A→ X ⊗ Y , there is f|X : X ⊗A→ Y such that
X
f|X
=f
f
A
X Y
Y
A
(11.4)
This property specializes to the property of Definition 11.1 by setting A = I.
In terms of Notation 2.8, equation (11.4) becomes a conditional version of the chain
rule,
f(x, y|a) = f|X(y|x, a)f(x|a),
which again is familiar from discrete probability, but now becomes valid in any Markov
category. If C has conditionals, then we similarly get a conditional f|Y (x|y, a) by suitable
permutations of the wires. This results in Bayes’ theorem in the generalized form
f|X(y|x, a)f(x|a) = f|Y (x|y, a)f(y|a),
where the special case A = I has been treated by Cho and Jacobs [15], and appears also
in similar form and somewhat implicitly in earlier work of Golubtsov [55, Theorem 6]18.
In typical examples, permitting A to be general in the definition of conditionals amounts
to a certain regularity condition on the formation of conditionals: if the joint distribution
of X and Y depends suitably nicely on A so as to form a morphism in C, then there also
is a conditional f|X which depends on A suitably nicely so as to form a morphism in C.
11.6. Example. FinStoch has conditionals. Similar to Example 11.2, for a given morphism
f(x, y|a) we form
f|X(y|x, a) :=
f(x, y|a)
f(x|a)
, (11.5)
in case that x ∈ X and a ∈ A are such that f(x|a) > 0, which again is essentially the
usual defining equation for conditional probabilities, and again arbitrary values satisfying
the normalization
∑
y f|X(y|x, a) = 1 otherwise.
18See also [52, Theorem 4] for an even earlier reference where Golubtsov’s considerations already appear
in the context of one particular category.
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11.7. Example. Continuing from Example 11.3, it was recently proven by Bogachev and
Malofeev that BorelStoch has conditionals [8, Theorem 3.5]19. In other words, a joint
distribution which depends measurably on another parameter a ∈ A has a conditional
whose dependence on a ∈ A is still measurable. This is obvious when the σ-algebra ΣA is
discrete, since then this extra measurability requirement is trivial.
11.8. Example. We now investigate whether Gauss (Section 6) has conditionals. A mor-
phism A→ X ⊗ Y can conveniently be represented in the block form((
M
N
)
,
(
Cξξ Cξη
Cηξ Cηη
)
,
(
s
t
))
,
meaning that we have
X = MA+ ξ, Y = NA+ η,
where now ξ and η are potentially correlated random variables, with the specified expec-
tations and covariance matrices. Using well-known results on conditionals of multivariate
Gaussians [30, Proposition 3.13], we find that the conditional distribution of Y given X
can itself be written in the form
Y = CηξC
−
ξξX + (N − CηξC
−
ξξM)A+ τ,
where τ is normal with expectation E[τ ] := t− CηξC
−
ξξs and variance
Var[τ ] := Cηη − CηξC
−
ξξCξη,
and C−ξξ is the Moore–Penrose pseudoinverse of Cξξ. This matrix satisfies the relevant
equations
C−ξξCξξC
−
ξξ = C
−
ξξ, CηξC
−
ξξCξξ = Cηξ , CξξC
−
ξξCξη = Cξη,
where the proof of the latter two employs standard properties of positive semidefinite ma-
trices20. The positive semidefiniteness of the above expression for Var[τ ] follows from the
fact that it is a matrix of the form vTCv, where C is the original covariance matrix in the
above block form and
v =
(
C−ξξCξη
−1
)
.
The dependence of Y on X and A therefore corresponds to the morphism X ⊗ A → Y
represented by the triple((
CηξC
−
ξξ N − CηξC
−
ξξM
)
, Cηη − CηξC
−
ξξCξη, t− CηξC
−
ξξs
)
,
reproducing formulas due to Lauritzen and Jensen [79, Section 4.5], which generalize Gol-
ubtsov’s earlier [50, Theorem 4]. A straightforward but tedious computation using the
19We thank Kenta Cho for pointing this out to us.
20They are simple to prove in a basis where Cξξ is diagonal: if there are zeros on the diagonal of Cξξ,
then positive semidefiniteness of C implies that the relevant rows and columns of Cηξ and Cξη must vanish
as well and hence can be ignored, reducing the problem to the case where Cξξ is invertible.
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Markov category structure introduced above shows that this morphism is indeed the de-
sired conditional in the sense of Definition 11.5. Therefore Gauss has conditionals.
We now present some open problems before developing the theory of conditionals fur-
ther.
11.9. Problem. Suppose that C is a Markov category which has conditionals, and D a small
category. Then does the functor category Fun(D,C) from Proposition 7.1 have conditionals
as well?
This is not obvious, because if we try to form the conditional of a morphism of diagrams
by doing so separately at each object of D, then there is no guarantee that we again obtain
a morphism of diagrams. A possible way around might be to relax the notion of morphism
of diagrams in some way with respect to almost sure equality (Section 13).
In measure-theoretic probability, conditioning is also often formalized in terms of con-
ditional expectations. We suspect that conditional expectations indeed arise from Defini-
tion 11.5 as well as follows.
11.10. Conjecture. There is a Markov category such that:
⊲ Objects are measurable spaces (X,ΣX), or some variant thereof such as measure
algebras [39].
⊲ Morphisms (X,ΣX)→ (Y,ΣY ) are some version of positive unital linear maps be-
tween spaces of bounded measurable functions in the other direction, L∞(Y,ΣY )→
L∞(X,ΣX), taking bounded directed suprema to bounded directed suprema.
⊲ The monoidal structure is given by some variant of the usual product of measurable
spaces.
⊲ The comultiplications X → X ⊗X are implemented by restriction to the diagonal,
L∞(X ×X,ΣX ⊗ ΣX) −→ L
∞(X,ΣX).
⊲ Conditionals exist in the sense of Definition 11.5, and are given by conditional
expectations.
One candidate for such a Markov category may be the category described in Exam-
ple 4.4.
Returning to the general theory, sometimes we may want to condition on more than
one output. The following guarantees that this can be done either all at once or step by
step:
11.11. Lemma. Suppose that C has conditionals. Then for any morphism f : A → X ⊗
Y ⊗ Z, we have
f|X⊗Y
Z
XY A
= (f|X)|Y
Z
XY A
A SYNTHETIC APPROACH TO MARKOV KERNELS AND STATISTICS 45
in the sense that every double conditional (f|X)|Y as on the right is also a conditional f|X⊗Y
as on the left (with first two inputs swapped).
Note that this result can also be applied iteratively in order to compute a conditional
f|X1⊗...⊗Xn of a morphism f : A → X1 ⊗ . . . ⊗ Xn ⊗ Y . So far we have not found any
formulation and proof of a converse, meaning a way to say that every conditional f|X⊗Y is
also a double conditional (f|X)|Y (with first two inputs swapped).
Proof. We start with the chosen (f|X)|Y and compute
(f|X)|Y
ZX Y
f
A
f|X
f
(f|X)|Y
ZX Y
A
= = f|X
f
(f|X)|Y
ZX Y
A
=
f
ZX Y
A
f|X
= f
A
X Y Z
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which shows indeed that the given (f|X)|Y ) is also a conditional f|X⊗Y , modulo swapping
the first two inputs. 
Conditioning also enjoys a certain compositionality property:
11.12. Lemma. If f : A → X ⊗W and g : W ⊗ B → Y are arbitrary morphisms and
f|X : X ⊗A→W is a corresponding conditional, then the composite
f
g
B
Y
A
X
has a conditional given by
f|X
g
B
Y
AX
Proof. Straightforward string diagram computation. 
11.13. Remark. As a special case, we obtain that conditioning commutes with marginal-
ization as follows. Using Notation 2.8, any f : A → X ⊗ Y ⊗ Z is such that the marginal
f|X(y|xa) of the conditional f|X(yz|xa) is also a conditional f(y|xa)|X for the marginal
f(xy|a). This follows from Lemma 11.12 upon taking B := I and g : Y ⊗Z → Y to be the
projection.
11.14. Remark. Besides the previous two lemmas, we have not been able to identify any
further potentially useful categorical properties of conditioning. Our original goal in this
work had been to axiomatize conditioning as an operation on a category satisfying certain
naturality conditions. We have abandoned this due to the lack of further candidate axioms
for conditioning which would hold e.g. in FinStoch, and the well-known problem that condi-
tionals are generally non-unique in cases where zero probabilities occur (Proposition 11.15),
leading us to suspect that a reasonably coherent choice of conditionals is not possible. We
have been all the more surprised to realize that conditioning is also not a very relevant
concept for most of the developments of this paper.
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Within our framework, it is impossible to guarantee the uniqueness of conditionals
except in uninteresting degenerate cases, because of the following observation.
11.15. Proposition. Suppose that C has conditionals. Then conditionals in C are unique
if and only if any two parallel morphisms in C are equal.
Proof. The “if” direction is trivial, so that we focus on the “only if” part. Assuming
the uniqueness of conditionals, we first prove that for every Y ∈ C, we have an equality of
morphisms Y ⊗ Y → Y given by
=
Indeed, a straightforward computation using the comonoid axioms (2.2) and (2.3) shows
that both sides are conditionals for the comultiplication
Now for any two parallel morphisms f, g : X → Y , we get
f = f =g gf = g
as was to be shown. 
11.16. Remark. The equality of parallel morphisms, f = g for f, g : X → Y , means
that C is equivalent to a preordered set: the category structure is uniquely determined by
writing X ≤ Y if and only if there is a (necessarily unique) morphism X → Y . Then the
comonoid structures of Definition 2.1 show that the tensor product of objects must be a
meet operation in the sense of lattice theory, making C into a meet-semilatice with neutral
element I ∈ C. Conversely, upon considering every meet-semilattice as a monoidal category,
it also is a Markov category which has unique conditionals.
The existence of conditionals implies a stronger disintegration property, which we will
relate to the standard notion of disintegration in measure-theoretic probability in Exam-
ple 11.18.
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11.17. Proposition (Disintegration). Suppose that C has conditionals. Then for every
p : A→ X and f : X → Y , there is s : A⊗ Y → X such that
p
f
s
=
p
f
(11.6)
For A = I and deterministic f , this equation implies the almost sure equality fs =fp-a.s.
idY (Section 13) by composing with f on the right output.
Proof. Define s to be a conditional of the morphism
p
f
on Y . This means that s satisfies the equation
p
f
s
=
p
f
which immediately implies the claim. 
11.18. Example. In Stoch, setting A = I in Proposition 11.17 and taking f to be given by
a measure-preserving function of measurable spaces f : X → Y specializes the statement
to the usual notion of disintegration of a probability measure p on X with respect to a
measure-preserving function f : X → Y .21 Indeed under these assumptions, (11.6) states
21For example, we may consider a sub-σ-algebra Σ′X and consider the measurable map f := idX :
(X,ΣX)→ (X,Σ
′
X), thereby recovering the notion of disintegration with respect to a sub-σ-algebra.
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that
p(f−1(T ) ∩ S)
!
=
∫
y∈T
s(S|y) (fp)(dy) =
∫
y∈T
s(S|y) p(f−1(dy))
for all S ∈ ΣX and T ∈ ΣY . This is exactly the usual notion of regular conditional probability.
It is well-known that regular conditional probabilities do not exist in general [28, p. 624].
We can therefore conclude, by the contrapositive of Proposition 11.17, that Stoch does not
have conditionals, as we had already noted in Example 11.3.
Randomness pushback. We move on to our second candidate axiom. It is inspired
by the treatment of random mappings in [70, Example 2.6(3)], and a similar definition has
been given as [22, Definition 8]. For FinStoch, it is well-known that randomness can be
“pushed back”, in the sense that every Markov kernel can be replaced by a deterministic
map with one extra input into which one feeds a random value with a fixed distribution.
11.19. Definition (Randomness pushback). We say that C has randomness pushback if
for every morphism f : X → Y in C, there are A ∈ C, deterministic g : A ⊗X → Y and
ψ : I → A such that
=f
ψ
g
(11.7)
While this is an interesting property, we will have no use for it in this paper. In certain
other contexts, it may be useful to apply it repeatedly. This happens for example in the the-
ory of Bayesian networks, where one can use it to prove the equivalence between Bayesian
networks with stochastic dependencies, and networks with purely functional (i.e. determin-
istic) dependencies plus extra “exogenous” root variables which supply the randomness [29].
Our new formal perspective should have the potential to shed new light on technical prob-
lems with measure-theoretic aspects in these contexts, such as [41, Conjecture 4.5].
As the following examples show more concretely, for Y = X randomness pushback
essentially specializes to the problem of representing a stochastic dynamical system in terms
of a random choice of deterministic dynamics [72, Theorem 1.1].
11.20. Example. FinStoch has randomness pushback. For given f , take A := Y X to be
the finite set of functions from X to Y , and define ψ : I → A by declaring the probability
weight of any function y ∈ Y X to be given by
ψ(y) :=
∏
x∈X
f(y(x)|x),
so that all the individual values y(x) are stochastically independent and have the same
distribution as f(y|x).22 Using the deterministic function g : Y X × X → Y given by
22Any other joint distribution with the same marginals on the Y -factors of Y X will work just as well.
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evaluation,
g(y, x) := y(x),
then clearly results in (11.7).
We do not know whether Stoch has randomness pushback in general. One obstacle
in generalizing the above argument from FinStoch to Stoch is the fact that Meas is not
cartesian closed [1].
11.21. Example. We now show that Gauss also has randomness pushback. Any morphism
(M,C, s) : n→ m, representing Y = MX+ξ, can be obtained by plugging in the morphism
ψ : 0 → m with parameters (0, C, s) into the addition map + : m +m → m, which is the
deterministic morphism represented by
((
1 1
)
, 0, 0
)
.
Positivity. Our third candidate axiom is a bit more mysterious. We will show that it
holds in our running examples, and then make crucial use of it to prove our version of the
Fisher–Neyman factorization theorem (Theorem 14.5).
11.22. Definition. We say that C is positive if whenever f : X → Y and g : Y → Z are
such that gf is deterministic, then also
g
f
g
=
f
f (11.8)
In terms of the upcoming Definition 12.12, this equation can be understood as say-
ing that the morphism shown on the left-hand side displays the conditional independence
Y ⊥ Z ||X. Intuitively, this equation means the following: if a deterministic process (first
output) has a random intermediate result (second output), then the same distribution over
both results can also be obtained by computing the intermediate result independently of
the deterministic process.
11.23. Remark. A relevant special case which comes up frequently is with gf = id, in
which case we get
g
=
f
f
The following result implies that many of our example Markov categories are indeed
positive, in particular FinStoch and Gauss.
11.24. Lemma. If C has conditionals, then C is positive.
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Proof. By Proposition 11.17, we have s such that
f
g
s
=
f
g
(11.9)
The determinism assumption evaluates this further to
s
ff
g g
=
s
ff
g g
f
g
=
f
g
where the second step is another use of (11.9). This implies the claim. 
The term “positive” in Definition 11.22 is motivated by the crucial role of the nonnega-
tivity of probabilities in the following arguments.
11.25. Example. Stoch is positive, as we now show. By the characterization of determin-
istic morphisms in Example 10.4, the assumption is that∫
y∈Y
g(S|y) f(dy|x) ∈ {0, 1} (11.10)
for all S ∈ ΣX and x ∈ X. By Lemma 4.2, what we want to prove is the equation∫
y∈T
g(S|y) f(dy|x) = f(T |y)
∫
y∈Y
g(S|y) f(dy|x) (11.11)
for all S ∈ ΣZ and T ∈ ΣY and x ∈ X.
It is easy to see that if the claimed equation holds for S, then it also holds for the
complementary event Z \ S. Thus it is enough to consider the case where (11.10) is zero.
Since an integral of a nonnegative function vanishes if and only if the integrand vanishes
almost surely, we can conclude that the integrand y 7→ g(S|y) vanishes f(−|x)-almost surely
on all of Y . Therefore both sides of the claimed equation (11.11) vanish as well.
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11.26. Remark. It is easy to see that if C→ C′ is a Markov embedding and C′ is positive,
then so is C. For example since Stoch is positive, the positivity of Gauss follows alternatively
from the Markov embedding Gauss→ Stoch of Proposition 6.1.
We now present a negative example.
11.27. Example. Let FinStoch± be defined just as FinStoch, but dropping the nonnega-
tivity of the matrix entries, so that a morphism f : X → Y is a matrix (f(y|x))x∈X,y∈Y
of arbitrary real numbers with
∑
y f(y|x) = 1 for all x ∈ X. In other words, negative
probabilities are allowed. FinStoch± is easily seen to be a Markov category in the same way
as FinStoch is. We can also obtain FinStoch± as a Markov category from the hypergraph
category Mat(R) via Section 8.
FinStoch± is not positive: a straightforward but slightly tedious computation shows
that
f =

 2 2−1 0
0 −1

 , g = (12 0 11
2 1 0
)
,
satisfy gf = id, but the equation of Remark 11.23 does not hold.
In particular, the contrapositive of Lemma 11.24 implies that FinStoch± does not have
conditionals. This can also be seen directly by noting that the desired equation for con-
ditional distributions, ψ(x, y) = ψ|X(y|x)ψ(x), has vanishing right-hand side whenever∑
y ψ(x, y) = 0, although the left-hand side does not need to vanish in this case.
Let us return to the general theory.
11.28. Remark. If C is positive, then it is easy to see that every isomorphism is deter-
ministic: just take g to be the inverse of the isomorphism f , and compose the equation
of Remark 11.23 with f ⊗ id. This is a property which fails in general Markov categories
(Section 9).
11.29. Remark. If C is positive, then we also get a stronger version of Remark 10.18: every
comonoid structure on every object X ∈ C is equal to the distinguished one. Namely, we
have gf = id if we take f to be the other comultiplication and g to be the marginalization
over the second tensor factor,
=
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Now applying the positivity condition of Remark 11.23 results in the equation
=
Marginalizing over the third output now shows that the two comultiplications must be
equal.
While we have not worked out the details, we therefore hope that it may be possi-
ble to define positive Markov categories equivalently as semicartesian symmetric monoidal
categories together with a symmetric monoidal equivalence to their category of internal
comonoids. This comes close to describing them entirely in 2-monadic terms.
These considerations make it seem plausible to us that some version of the positivity
condition could also be of interest in the study of hypergraph categories [73, 35, 37].
Using positivity, we can strengthen Lemma 10.9(b).
11.30. Lemma. Suppose that C is positive. Let f : X → Y and g : Y → Z in C. If gf is
deterministic and f is an epimorphism, then g is deterministic as well.
Proof. This is by the same computation as in the proof of Lemma 10.9, now using
the positivity axiom for the second step. 
We finally consider another property which will be of use in some of our later proofs. As
we show in Remark 11.36, this axiom is closely related to the notion of equality strengthening
introduced by Cho and Jacobs [15, Definition 5.7] (Remark 11.36).
11.31. Definition. We say that C is causal if the following condition holds: whenever
f
h1
=
g
f
h2
g
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holds for any morphisms as indicated, then also
f
h1
=g
f
h2
g (11.12)
The name of this condition indicates that we think of it as a causality property: with
time going up, we assume that the choice of using h1 or h2 at a late time has no influence on
how its outcome is correlated with what happened at an earlier time; and then if causality
holds, we can conclude that there is no correlation with what happened at an even earlier
time either.
11.32. Remark. One may wonder how our axiom relates to the naturality condition on
the counit (2.5), which is sometimes also called causality [19, 14]. So which one of the
two actually expresses causality, and correspondingly deserves to carry the name causality
axiom? Our perspective is that they both capture disjoint aspects of the causality of infor-
mation flow. It is an open question, suggested to us by Thomas C. Fraser, whether there is
an interesting causality axiom or axiom schema which comprises both as special cases, and
which could be argued to capture all aspects of causality.
It may also be the case that our Definition 11.22 and Definition 11.31 are instances of
a more comprehensive axiom comprising both as special cases. We have not yet found any
such condition either.
The implication postulated by the causality axiom holds automatically in many cases:
for example if f is deterministic; if g is deterministic; if f is an epimorphism; if gf = g; or
if C has conditionals (Proposition 11.34). It is correspondingly nontrivial to find examples
where our causality condition fails. Here is one.
11.33. Example. Applying Proposition 9.1 with D := Setop shows that the opposite of
the category of commutative monoids with unit-preserving functions is a Markov category.
Using additive notation for the monoid operations, Definition 11.31 now states the following:
whenever f , g and h1, h2 are unit-preserving maps between commutative monoids, and if
the equation
f(g(h1(x) + y)) = f(g(h2(x) + y)) (11.13)
holds for all x and y, then also the stronger equation
f(g(h1(x) + y) + z) = f(g(h2(x) + y) + z) (11.14)
holds for all x, y and z. To see that this is not true in general, let us specialize to the
monoid (N,+) and all maps of type (N,+) → (N,+), and consider more concretely the
maps given by
f(x) := max(x− 1, 0), g(x) := min(x, 1), h1(x) := x, h2(x) := 0,
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which clearly all preserve the unit 0. Then fg = 0, so that the assumption (11.13) holds
trivially. However, the conclusion (11.14) fails with x = z = 1 and y = 0. We therefore
have found a Markov category which is not causal.
Many uses of the causality condition use it only in a weaker form, where the middle
output in (11.12) is marginalized over; see e.g. the proof of Proposition 13.9.
We now show that causality is intimately related to the existence of conditionals.
11.34. Proposition. If C has conditionals, then C is causal.
Proof. In terms of s as in the proof of Lemma 11.24,
f
h1
g =
g
f
h1
s
=
g
f
h1
s
Since h2 can be replaced by h2 on the right-hand side by assumption, the same holds true
on the left-hand side. 
It follows in particular that FinStoch and Gauss are causal. The next example shows
in particular that causality does not imply the existence of conditionals, and is therefore
strictly weaker.
11.35. Example. Stoch is causal despite not having conditionals (Example 11.18). Indeed,
with f : A→ X and g : X → Y and h1, h2 : Y → Z, the assumption is that∫
x∈X
∫
y∈T
h1(U |y) g(dy|x) f(dx|a) =
∫
x∈X
∫
y∈T
h2(U |y) g(dy|x) f(dx|a) (11.15)
for all T ∈ ΣY and U ∈ ΣZ and a ∈ A. What we need to prove is that this equation implies
a generalization where the domain of integration of x is a general S ∈ ΣX ,∫
x∈S
∫
y∈T
h1(U |y) g(dy|x) f(dx|a) =
∫
x∈S
∫
y∈T
h2(U |y) g(dy|x) f(dx|a). (11.16)
Writing the assumption (11.15) in the form∫
y∈T
h1(U |y)
∫
x∈X
g(dy|x) f(dx|a) =
∫
y∈T
h2(U |y)
∫
x∈X
g(dy|x) f(dx|a)
results in two functions on Y whose integrals over every T ∈ ΣY are equal when integrated
against the measure
∫
x∈X g(dy|x) f(dx|a). Hence the functions y 7→ h1(U |y) and y 7→
h2(U |y) are equal almost surely with respect to this measure. Therefore they are also
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equal almost everywhere with respect to any submeasure
∫
x∈S g(dy|x) f(dx|a) for arbitrary
S ∈ ΣX , which is (11.16). Hence Stoch is causal.
11.36. Remark. As pointed out to us by Kenta Cho, our causality condition is closely
related to the notion of equality strengthening considered by Cho and Jacobs [15, Defini-
tion 5.7]. Indeed, equality strengthening means that every equation of the form
h1
ψ
=
h2
ψ
implies the stronger equation
h1
ψ
=
h2
ψ
Now if C is causal in the sense of Definition 11.31, then it also admits equality strengthening,
as one can see readily by taking f to be ψ and g to be the marginalization map which dis-
cards the right output. Furthermore, if one generalizes equality strengthening by replacing
the ψ above by an arbitrary morphism with nontrivial input, then it is straightforward to
prove that causality and generalized equality strengthening are equivalent.
There is also an existing proof showing that the existence of conditionals implies equal-
ity strengthening in the original sense [15, Proposition 5.8], which now also follows from
Proposition 11.34. Similarly, the proof that Stoch has equality strengthening given by Cho
and Jacobs [15, Proposition 5.9] now follows from Example 11.35. On the other hand,
Kenta Cho has informed us that equality strengthening is enough for the proof of our
Proposition 13.9(a).
12. Conditional independence and the semigraphoid properties
Conditional independence is a central concept in probability, for example due to its
importance for statistics [24] and its basic role in the definition of graphical model [78].
Generalizing conditional independence to arbitrary Markov categories is therefore a natural
part of developing synthetic probability theory. Among other things, a formal treatment of
conditional independence at our level of generality enables the interpretation of graphical
models in any Markov category (although we will not elaborate on this further).
Traditionally, conditional independence is closely tied to conditioning. For example
in FinStoch, a distribution ψ : I → X ⊗W ⊗ Y is considered to display the conditional
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independence of X and Y given W if the conditional ψ|W (xy|w) satisfies the factorization
ψ|W (xy|w) = ψ|W (x|w)ψ|W (y|w),
or a number of equivalent reformulations of this equation, such as ψ(xyw)ψ(w) =
ψ(xw)ψ(yw). In the context of Markov categories with conditional distributions, condi-
tional independence has been defined by Cho and Jacobs [15], who proved that some of
the usual equivalences hold at this level of generality, where they can be derived in terms
of string diagrams. In [15, Proposition 6.10], Cho and Jacobs also showed that their
generalized notion of conditional independence satisfies the well-known semigraphoid prop-
erties [97], [111, Section 2.2.2]. In a somewhat different technical setup, similar definitions
had also been made earlier by Coecke and Spekkens [21, Section 5.1], who also proved the
equivalence of various definitions [21, Proposition 5.3] under strong assumptions on the
existence of their version of conditionals.
Here, we will show that it is still meaningful to introduce and work with conditional
independence in the absence of conditionals. However, now the single notion of conditional
independence splits into several distinct ones. For example, one may want to say that for a
morphism X → Y ⊗Z, the output Y is independent of the input X given the output Z (as
in the definition of sufficient statistic, Definition 14.3). Here, the standard notion of condi-
tional independence does not apply directly, since X does not come with any distribution;
it therefore seems pertinent to distinguish this notion of conditional independence from the
corresponding one for distributions I → X ⊗Y ⊗Z. We believe that such distinctions may
be able to shed further light on Dawid’s analysis of the role of conditional independence in
statistics [24], where distinct notions of conditional independence seem to be coming up.
In the following, we introduce the relevant definitions of conditional independence and
study some of their properties, proving versions of the semigraphoid properties as well as
certain compositionality properties, including conditional products. Our various definitions
of conditional independence can be unified by formulating them in terms of disconnecting
the relevant string diagrams (Remark 12.21). An interesting application, which we mostly
leave to future work, should be to instantiate these definitions in Stoch, the category of
measurable spaces and Markov kernels of Section 4, and to compare it in more detail with
existing notions of conditional independence in measure-theoretic probability (Remark 12.4).
One difficulty here is that Stoch does not have conditionals (Example 11.3). Instantiating
our definitions and results in this case should give a theory of conditional independence
for Markov kernels between products of arbitrary measurable spaces, which may be new
(since conditional independence is usually primarily considered for joint distributions of
three random variables, or equivalently for a triple of σ-algebras on a probability space).
Concretely, we start by introducing two simple notions of conditional independence, one
denoted X ⊥ Y |W for “distributions” I → X ⊗W ⊗ Y , and one denoted X ⊥ Y ||A for
“processes” A → X ⊗ Y , and study some of their properties. Subsequently, we will show
how to combine both notions into one more general notion of conditional independence for
morphisms A→ X ⊗W ⊗ Y .
58 TOBIAS FRITZ
12.1. Definition. Let C be a Markov category. A morphism ψ : I → X ⊗W ⊗ Y in C
displays the conditional independence X ⊥ Y |W if there are f : W → X, g : W → Y and
φ : I →W such that
φ
f g=ψ
(12.1)
12.2. Remark. In terms of Notation 2.8, marginalizing over the first and third output
shows that φ must be equal to the marginal ψ(w). Marginalizing over the third output only
then shows that f must be a conditional ψ(xw)|W in the sense of Definition 11.5. Similarly,
g must be a conditional ψ(yw)|W .
Our definition essentially coincides with the characterization given by Cho and Ja-
cobs in [15, Proposition 6.9(2)], who have shown that it is equivalent to the factorization
ψ|W (xy|w) = ψ|W (x|w)ψ|W (y|w), in terms of Notation 2.8, if conditionals exist. In the
case of FinStoch, this implies in particular that Definition 12.1 is equivalent to the usual
definition of conditional independence for probability distributions on products of finite
sets.
Note that our definition applies regardless of whether C has conditionals or not. And
of course, it also applies when X, W or Y are themselves tensor products of other objects.
The latter recovers the fact that conditional independence as usually conceived applies to
sets of random variables [111].
12.3. Remark. As a simple special case going back to Manes [89, Section 5] and Gol-
ubtsov [55, Section 7.1], for W = I we get the obvious notion of plain independence: a
morphism ψ : I → X ⊗ Y displays the independence X ⊥ Y if and only if
ψ ψ ψ
=
which, in terms of Notation 2.8, becomes exactly the usual factorization condition ψ(x, y) =
ψ(x)ψ(y).
12.4. Remark. It is an interesting problem to work out what Definition 12.1 instantiates
to in Stoch. The following is based on discussion with Alex Simpson.
In Stoch, our definition directly coincides with the one given by Dawid and Studeny´
via [27, 2.2.2 & Eq. (3)]; while their definition uses regular conditional probabilities in place
of f and g, our f and g must also automatically be conditionals as noted in Remark 12.2.
A more commonly used definition of conditional independence in measure-theoretic
probability is arguably the definition of conditional independence for a triple of σ-algebras
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on a probability space in terms of conditional expectation [17, Section 7.3]. Applying this
definition in the case of a measure ψ on a product σ-algebra ΣX⊗ΣW ⊗ΣZ, using the three
constituting factors, also gives a notion of conditional independence for ψ : I → X⊗W ⊗Y
in Stoch, in the form
E[1S∩T |ΣW ] = E[1S |ΣW ]E[1T |ΣW ] (12.2)
for all S ∈ ΣX and T ∈ ΣY . (The general definition involving a triple of σ-algebras is not
really more general, since one can always work with the third power of the original space,
equipped with the product of the three original σ-algebras, and equipping this product
measurable space with the pushforward probability measure along the diagonal inclusion.)
While we currently do not see how to arrive at the more commonly used definition (12.2)
within our framework, we suspect that a Markov category as in Conjecture 11.10 would do
exactly that.
Returning to the general theory, we can now derive versions of the four semigraphoid
properties, which we state in terms of Notation 2.8.
12.5. Lemma. The following hold:
(a) Symmetry: if ψ(x,w, y) displays X ⊥ Y |W , then ψ(y,w, x) displays Y ⊥ X |W .
(b) Decomposition: if ψ(x1, x2, w, y) displays (X1 ⊗X2) ⊥ Y |W , then the marginal
ψ(x1, w, y) displays X1 ⊥ Y |W .
(c) Contraction: if ψ(x,w, z, y) displays X ⊥ Y | (W ⊗ Z) and the marginal ψ(x,w, z)
displays X ⊥ Z |W , then ψ also displays X ⊥ (Z ⊗ Y ) |W .
Moreover if C has conditionals, then also:
(d) Weak union: if ψ(x1, x2, w, y) displays (X1 ⊗X2) ⊥ Y |W , then it also displays
X1 ⊥ Y | (W ⊗X2).
12.6. Remark. On first look, these statements may sound more complicated than the
usual semigraphoid properties, since they state explicitly which morphism displays the
conditional independence, where this morphism is taken to be the given joint distribution
of all variables under consideration. But this is implicitly contained also in the standard
way of phrasing the semigraphoid properties, and our formulation merely makes this more
explicit.
Proof. The first two statements are trivial. Concerning (c), we have the assumptions
φ
f g=
ψ
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η
h k=
ψ
φ
f=
for suitable additional morphisms as indicated, where the final equation follows by marginal-
izing the first one. Substituting this third equation into the first one gives
ψ
=
η
h
k
g
=
η
h k
g
which proves the claim.
We now show (d). By the assumption that ψ(x1, x2, w, y) displays (X1 ⊗X2) ⊥ Y |W ,
we have φ : I →W and f : W → X1 ⊗X2 and g : W → Y such that
φ
f g
=
ψ
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By conditioning f on the second output, we can also write this in the form
φ
f
gf|X2
=
φ
f
gf|X2
=
where now the dashed boxes indicate the desired conditional independence factorization. 
12.7. Problem. Beyond the semigraphoid properties of Lemma 12.5, does our general no-
tion of conditional independence also satisfy the additional implication between conditional
independences in probability found by Studeny´ [110]?
An interesting compositionality property of joint distributions is the possibility of con-
structing conditional products, as first defined by Dawid and Studeny´ [27] and generalized
in a sheaf-theory-like categorical framework in [33]. We now show how to construct con-
ditional products in any Markov category which has conditionals, and we prove that they
satisfy the axioms of Dawid and Studeny´. To this end, we work with the conceptually
clearer but equivalent framework of gleaves on a lattice [33, Section 4.1].
12.8. Definition. Suppose that C has conditionals. Then for any ψ : I → X ⊗W and
φ : I →W ⊗ Y with equal marginals on W ,
ψ φ=:=π
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the conditional product of ψ and φ is defined by
ψ|W φ|W
π
X W Y
ψ ⊗W φ
X W Y
:=
(12.3)
The calculation
ψ|W φ|W
π
= ψ|W
φ|W
ψ
=
φ|W
ψ
(12.4)
shows that the conditional product does not depend on the particular choice of conditional
ψ|W , and similarly for φ|W (compare Proposition 13.7). Hence ψ ⊗W φ is well-defined.
The conditional product forms part of our story on conditional independence as follows.
12.9. Proposition. If C has conditionals, then the conditional product (12.3) is the unique
morphism I → X ⊗W ⊗ Y which marginalizes to both ψ and φ and displays X ⊥ Y |W .
Proof. The fact that ψ⊗W φ displaysX ⊥ Y |W is immediate from the definition. The
fact that it marginalizes to ψ and φ is clear by the definition of conditionals (Definition 11.5).
Conversely, if η : I → X ⊗W ⊗Y has these properties, then consider a factorization (12.1).
By Remark 12.2, the f and g making up that factorization must be the corresponding
conditionals of the marginals of η, i.e. of ψ and φ. Hence η is exactly the conditional
product. 
Still assuming that C has conditionals, we now explain how marginalization and con-
ditional products define a gleaf [33] on Pfin(O), the lattice of finite subsets of any set of
objects O ⊆ Obj(C). To every A ∈ Pfin(O) we assign the set of morphisms
23 I →
⊗
X∈AX.
For any inclusion A ⊆ B, marginalization defines a restriction map
C
(
I,
⊗
X∈B
X
)
−→ C
(
I,
⊗
X∈A
X
)
,
23Strictly speaking, we need to make a choice of order for this finite tensor product, but the particular
choice is irrelevant. One way to do this is to fix any total order on O and order the objects in A accordingly.
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and it is easy to see that this results in a presheaf on Pfin(O). The above conditional
products equip this presheaf with a gluing operation: in [33, Definition 4.1.1], property
(a) holds because a conditional product marginalizes to the two given original morphisms.
Condition (c) holds because of the commutativity of conditioning with marginalization
described in Remark 11.13. Condition (b) amounts to the claim that for ψ : I → X ⊗W
and φ : I →W ⊗ Y ⊗ Z, the conditional product can be computed in two steps,
ψ ⊗W φ = (ψ ⊗W φ(wy)) ⊗W⊗Y φ, (12.5)
where we have again used Notation 2.8. The proof of this property is more involved: using
the alternative representation for the conditional product given on the right of (12.4), we
compute
φ|W
ψ
φ|W
ψ
φ|W⊗Y
φ|W
ψ
(φ|W )|Y
= =
where the second step consists of reordering wires and applying24 Lemma 11.11. Since
this is exactly the desired (12.5), we conclude that we indeed have a gleaf, or equivalently
conditional products satisfying the axioms of Dawid and Studeny´. We can therefore apply
the theory of gleaves as developed in [33]. One consequence is that conditional products
enjoy an associativity property [33, Proposition 4.3.4].
12.10. Remark. This associativity property of conditional products implies in particular
that marginalizing a conditional product in the form (12.3) over W defines the composition
in a symmetric monoidal category which we call the category of couplings, where:
⊲ Objects are pairs (X,πX ) where πX : I → X.
⊲ The hom-set between (X,πX) and (X,πY ) is the set of all ψ : I → X ⊗ Y with
marginals ψ(x) = πX and ψ(y) = πY .
⊲ Composition is given by the conditional product (12.3) marginalized over the mid-
dle output.
24This step shows that we really need the existence of conditionals in the sense of Definition 11.5,
whereas conditional distributions alone in the sense of Definition 11.1 are not enough for our argument to
go through.
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⊲ The identity morphism of (X,πX) is given by copyX ◦ πX .
It is also straightforward to verify directly that this data defines a category, and that it has
a symmetric monoidal structure defined in the obvious way. However, we believe that the
compositional structure of conditional products is more accurately captured by the concept
of gleaf as described above. The main reason is that this keeps track of the joint distribution
of all variables involved, not requiring one to apply marginalization during composition; it
also unifies the sequential product and the monoidal product that we will consider more
explicitly in Proposition 13.9 into one kind of gluing.
This ends our discussion of conditional independence via Definition 12.1. However, just
as with the notion of conditional in Definition 11.5, we expect the concept of conditional
independence to be meaningful also for morphisms whose domain is not the monoidal
unit. In order to lead up to this, we briefly consider a notion of conditional independence
X ⊥ Y ||A for morphisms A→ X ⊗ Y closely related to the original definition of Cho and
Jacobs [15, Definition 6.6]; and also to the earlier conditions CI2L and CI2R of Coecke and
Spekkens [21, Section 5.1], which takes place in a different categorical setup.
12.11. Lemma. Given a morphism f : A→ X ⊗ Y , the following are equivalent:
(a) f(x, y|a) = f(x|a)f(y|a) in terms of Notation 2.8, meaning that
=f
f f
(b) There are g : A→ X and h : A→ Y such that
=f
g h
Proof. While one direction is trivial, the other is by straightforward marginalization.

12.12. Definition. Let C be a Markov category. If a morphism f : A → X ⊗ Y satisfies
these equivalent conditions, then we say that f displays the conditional independence X ⊥
Y ||A.
Here, we use the double bar “ ||” notation in order to indicate independence conditional
on an input, to be distinguished from independence conditional on an output as in Defini-
tion 12.1.
We now have at least the simplest two of the semigraphoid properties, in terms of
Notation 2.8.
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12.13. Lemma. The following hold:
(a) Symmetry: if f(x, y|a) displays X ⊥ Y ||A, then f(y, x|a) displays Y ⊥ X ||A.
(b) Decomposition: if f(x1, x2, y|a) displays (X1 ⊗X2) ⊥ Y ||A, then the marginal
f(x1, y|a) displays X1 ⊥ Y ||A.
Proof. Straightforward. 
This notion of conditional independence also interacts well with positivity. The follow-
ing property generalizes the well-known fact that if a probability measure on a product
σ-algebra has a deterministic marginal, then it is a product measure.
12.14. Proposition. Let C be positive (Definition 11.22). Then if a morphism f : A →
X ⊗ Y is such that its marginal A→ X is deterministic, then f displays X ⊥ Y ||A.
Proof. We apply the positivity property of Definition 11.22 with f in place of f and
the marginalization morphism
in place of g. Then the resulting (11.8) instantiates to
f=
f
f
Marginalizing over the second output now gives the desired factorization. 
12.15. Corollary. Let C be positive. Then for a morphism f : A→ X ⊗ Y , the following
are equivalent:
(a) f is deterministic.
(b) Both marginals of f are deterministic.
Proof. Assuming (a), the claim (b) is clear since the marginalization map itself is
deterministic as well. The implication from (b) to (a) is a straightforward string diagram
computation,
f f
f f f
f ff f
= = =
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where the first and third step are by Proposition 12.14 and the second one is by assumption.

We now introduce our more involved combined notion of conditional independence,
which has not been considered before.
12.16. Definition. A morphism f : A→ X⊗W⊗Y displays the conditional independence
X ⊥ Y |W ||A if there are g : A→ W , h : A⊗W → X and k : W ⊗A→ Y such that
g
h k
=f
It is straightforward to see that this specializes to Definition 12.12 for W = I and to
Definition 12.1 for A = I.
We now have some more complicated but general rules for reasoning about this kind of
conditional independence. Again these are versions of the usual semigraphoid properties,
phrased in terms of Notation 2.8.
12.17. Proposition. The following hold:
(a) Symmetry: if f(x,w, y|a) displays X ⊥ Y |W ||A, then f(y,w, x|a) displays Y ⊥
X |W ||A.
(b) Decomposition: if f(x1, x2, w, y|a) displays (X1 ⊗X2) ⊥ Y |W ||A, then the mar-
ginal f(x1, w, y|a) displays X1 ⊥ Y |W ||A.
(c) Contraction: if f(x,w, z, y|a) displays X ⊥ Y | (W ⊗ Z) ||A and the marginal
f(x,w, z|a) displays X ⊥ Z |W ||A, then f also displays X ⊥ (Z ⊗ Y ) |W ||A.
Moreover if C has conditionals, then also:
(d) Weak union: if f(x1, x2, w, y|a) displays (X1 ⊗X2) ⊥ Y |W ||A, then it also dis-
plays X1 ⊥ Y | (W ⊗X2) ||A.
Proof. Again the first two implications are trivial. The proof of (c) and (d) are simple
but somewhat tedious generalizations of the corresponding proofs for Lemma 12.5, which
we leave to the reader. 
Moreover, conditional independence enjoys certain compositionality properties, formu-
lated as follows in terms of Notation 2.8.
12.18. Proposition. The following hold:
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(a) If a morphism f(x1, w1, y1|a1) displays X1 ⊥ Y1 |W1 ||A1 and g(x2, w2, y2|a2)
displays X2 ⊥ Y2 |W2 ||A2, then (f ⊗ g)(x1, x2, w1, w2, y1, y2|a1, a2) displays
(X1 ⊗X2) ⊥ (Y1 ⊗ Y2) | (W1 ⊗W2) || (A1 ⊗A2).
(b) If a morphism f(x1, v, y1|a) displays X1 ⊥ Y1 |V ||A and g(x2, w, y2|v) displays
X2 ⊥ Y2 |W ||V , then also the composite morphism
f
g
X1X2 V W Y2 Y1
A
displays (X1 ⊗X2) ⊥ (Y2 ⊗ Y1) | (V ⊗W ) ||A.
(c) If a morphism f(x1, w, y2|a) displays X1 ⊥ Y1 |W ||A and g : A ⊗X1 → X2 and
h : Y1 ⊗A→ Y2 are arbitrary, then also the composite morphism
f
g h
X2 W Y2
A
displays X2 ⊥ Y2 |W ||A.
(d) If C has conditionals and a morphism f(x, v, w, y|a) displays X ⊥ Y | (V ⊗W ) ||A,
then there is a conditional f|V (x,w, y|v, a) which displays X ⊥ Y |W || (V ⊗A).
While property (b) is somewhat reminiscent of contraction, property (d) is similar to
weak union.
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Proof. (a) and (c) are straightforward. For (b), note that the assumptions imply that
the composite morphism has the form
= =
X1X2 V W Y2 Y1
A
A
X1X2 V W Y2 Y1
X1X2 V W Y2 Y1
A
where we leave the relevant morphisms unnamed. The dashed boxes indicate the claimed
conditional independence decomposition.
Concerning (d), the assumption implies that f has the form
g
h k
=f
X V W Y
A
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We construct a new morphism which involves a conditional g|V ,
h k
g|V
X Y
V A
W
which clearly displays X ⊥ Y |W || (V ⊗A). Furthermore, we verify that this morphism is
a conditional f|V ,
g
h k
h k
g|V
=
g
h k
g|V
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=
g
h k
= f
which finishes the proof. 
There is one more notion of conditional independence, which will be of relevance to us
in Section 14. We do not yet know how it is related to the one of Definition 12.16.
12.19. Definition. Given a morphism f : A → X ⊗ Y , we say that f displays the condi-
tional independence A ⊥⊥ Y |X if it is of the form
=f
X Y
A A
X Y
Here, the diagram on the right represents a Markov process, from A to X to Y . This
notion of conditional independence appears in the definition of sufficient statistic (Defini-
tion 14.3).
For A = I, one would expect that this conditional independence always holds. This is
indeed the case as soon as C has conditional distributions, since the conditional indepen-
dence equation for I ⊥⊥ Y |X amounts to precisely the existence of a conditional for the
given morphism I → X ⊗ Y .
Again we have versions of the semigraphoid properties in terms of Notation 2.8, except
for symmetry which no longer can even be stated.
12.20. Proposition. The following hold:
(a) Right decomposition: if f(x, y1, y2|a) displays A ⊥⊥ (Y1 ⊗ Y2) |X, then the marginal
f(x, y1|a) displays A ⊥⊥ Y1 |X.
(b) Contraction: if f(x,w, y|a) displays A ⊥⊥ Y | (W ⊗X) and the marginal f(x,w|a)
displays A ⊥⊥W |X, then f also displays A ⊥⊥ (W ⊗ Y ) |X.
Moreover if C has conditionals, then also:
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(c) Weak union: if f(x,w, y|a) displays A ⊥⊥ (W ⊗ Y ) |X, then it also displays A ⊥⊥
Y | (W ⊗X).
Proof. The proof of (a) is straightforward. For (b), we compute
=f
YWX
A
YWX
A
=
YWX
A
=
YWX
A
where the assumptions are used in the first two steps. For (c), we get
f
YWX
A
=
g
=
g|W
g
=
g|W
g

There may be one more notion of conditional independence along the lines of [21,
Properties CI1L, CI1R] and [15, Proposition 6.9(3)], where a morphism f : A ⊗ B → X
displays this conditional independence of A and X given B if it can be written in a form
which simply discards A,
f =
X
A B
X
A B
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We will not study this notion of conditional independence further in this paper.
12.21. Remark. As has been pointed out to us by Rob Spekkens, all of our definitions of
conditional independence have a central feature in common, namely that upon removing
all wires from the diagram which refer to objects on which we condition, the diagram
disconnects into parts which then become conditionally independent. We hope that this
observation may lead to a more unified and more systematic perspective on conditional
independence in our setup as a theory of “conditional connectedness”, providing a general
understanding of conditional independence as a form of separation similar to separation
in undirected graphical models [78], simpler and more intuitive than the complicated d-
separation criterion for conditional independence in Bayesian networks [96].
Let us end this section with some comments on the relation to other existing axiomatic
systems for conditional independence relations. We have already done so throughout this
section for the most well-known such system: the semigraphoid axioms. However, others
with a more explicitly categorical flavour have been proposed.
Franz’s notion of independent morphisms. Franz [38], and later Gerhold, Lachs
and Schu¨rmann [48], have developed a categorical framework for independence which uni-
fies and generalizes several notions of independence that had previously been considered,
including ordinary stochastic independence in probability theory and free independence in
free probability. However, the basic setup is quite different, and involves working with a cat-
egory of random variables, meaning measure-preserving maps between probability spaces,
instead of a category of Markov kernels. In our setup, involving a Markov category C whose
morphisms we think of as Markov kernels between measurable spaces, we can define a prob-
ability space as a pair (X,ψ) consisting of an object X ∈ C and a morphism ψ : I → X.
A random variable or measure-preserving map from (X,ψ) to (Y, φ) is then a deterministic
morphism f : X → Y such that f ◦ψ = φ. In other words, we consider the comma category
I/Cdet on C, where Cdet ⊆ C is the subcategory of deterministic morphisms, as our category
of probability spaces25. This category is then again semicartesian, so that Franz’s notion
of independence applies. Instantiating his definition then gives the following, for (X,ψ) a
probability space in our sense: deterministic morphisms f : X → Y and g : X → Z are
independent if and only if there is deterministic h : X → Y ⊗ Z satisfying
ψ
h
=
ψ
f
ψ
h
=
ψ
g
Due to the cartesianness of the monoidal subcategory of deterministic morphisms (Re-
mark 10.13), we can conclude that h is necessarily equal to the tupling (f, g) : X → Y ⊗Z,
25See Remark 13.14 for a more refined approach.
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the unique deterministic morphism which projects to f and g. Therefore f and g are inde-
pendent in Franz’s sense if and only if (f, g) ◦ ψ displays the independence Y ⊥ Z in the
sense of Remark 12.3. Note that (f, g) ◦ ψ : I → Y ⊗ Z can be interpreted as the joint
distribution of the random variables f and g.
In summary, Franz’s definition keeps track explicitly of the sample space on which ran-
dom variables are defined (the X in our discussion above), while our notion of conditional
independence of Definition 12.1 does not. And there is no need to, as independence is a
property only of the joint distribution of two random variables, regardless of the underlying
sample space. Apart from this difference, Franz’s notion of independence, when instanti-
ated in categories of probability spaces which are constructed from Markov categories, is
essentially equivalent to the one of Remark 12.3.
Simpson’s axioms for conditional independence. Simpson [108] has proposed
rather general axioms for independence and conditional independence in a categorical frame-
work. When applied to probabilistic independence, one needs to work with categories of
probability spaces, just as in Franz’s approach. The key difference is that Simpson does
not define what (conditional) independence means in such a category, but rather proposes
axioms which any reasonable notion of conditional independence should satisfy. We have
not yet undertaken a more detailed comparison with Simpson’s approach.
13. Almost surely
A notion that appears in almost every theorem of probability is almost surely. In the
context of Markov categories, an elegant axiomatization of almost sure equality has been
given by Cho and Jacobs [15, Definition 5.1]. Here, we generalize their definition and prove
further properties. We also put forward the idea that many other concepts can be relativized
with respect to almost surely, and illustrate this by introducing an “almost surely” variant
of deterministic morphisms (Definition 10.1). This concept then will be shown to interact
well with almost sure equality. As an application, we construct the category of probability
spaces internal to any Markov category C.
The following definition specializes to one given by Cho and Jacobs [15, Definition 5.1]
in the case Θ = I. Our choice of notation p : Θ → X anticipates statistical models
(Definition 14.1), indicating that almost sure equality is particularly relevant in a context
where Θ is a parameter space for a statistical model living on a sample space X.
13.1. Definition. Given any morphism p : Θ → X, we say that f, g : X → Y are p-
a.s. equal and write f =p-a.s. g if
p
f
=
p
g
13.2. Example. In FinStoch, we have f =p-a.s. g if and only if f(y|x) = g(y|x) for all
x ∈ X for which there is a ∈ A with p(x|a) > 0.
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13.3. Example. In Stoch, we have f =p-a.s. g if and only if∫
S
f(T |x) p(dx|a) =
∫
S
g(T |x) p(dx|a) (13.1)
for all a ∈ A and S ∈ ΣX and T ∈ ΣY . This is equivalent to the functions f(T |−), g(T |−) :
X → [0, 1] being almost surely equal with respect to the probability measure p(−|a) on X
for every parameter value a, generalizing [15, Proposition 5.3].
If f and g are the images in Stoch of morphisms in Meas, which by abuse of notation
we also denote by f, g : X → Y , then this condition is equivalent to
p(S ∩ f−1(T )|a) = p(S ∩ g−1(T )|a)
for all a ∈ A, S ∈ ΣX and T ∈ ΣY . Using the additivity of the probability measure p(−|a),
this is readily seen to be equivalent to the condition that
p
(
f−1(T ) \ g−1(T )
∣∣ a) = 0 = p(g−1(T ) \ f−1(T )∣∣ a)
for all a ∈ A and T ∈ ΣY . Expressed in terms of symmetric difference △, we can also write
this as
p
(
f−1(T )△ g−1(T )
∣∣ a) = 0,
which is a known condition26 equivalent to almost sure equality in the standard sense for
countably generated σ-algebras [39, 343F], but known to be different in general: Frem-
lin [39, 343J] presents an intuitive example of a measurable and measure-preserving map
f from a measure space (X,ΣX , p) to itself such that although f(x) 6= x for all x ∈ X and
ΣX separates the points of X, the map f is p-almost surely equal to idX in our sense.
Generally speaking, our working hypothesis is that (13.1) is the “correct” notion of
almost sure equality in Stoch. This hypothesis will be supported by our results of the
following sections, where we find that using (13.1) as almost sure equality recovers standard
concepts, such as bounded completeness (Example 15.4).
Returning to the general theory, here is a basic property of a.s. equality which follows
directly from the definition.
13.4. Lemma. Let p : Θ → X. If f =p-a.s. g for f, g : X → Y and h : Y → Z, then also
hf =p-a.s. hg.
Furthermore, an occasionally useful fact is that if g =p-a.s. f , then the defining equation
still holds with more than one copy operation taking place before the application of f or g.
This is a special case of the following:
26It had been introduced to us by Robert Furber and seems to be due to Edgar [31, Section 1].
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13.5. Lemma. Let p : Θ → X. If f1, f2 : X → Y and g1, g2 : X → Z are such that
f1 =p-a.s. f2 and g1 =p-a.s. g2, then also
p
f1 g1
=
p
f2 g2
Proof. Straightforward application of the assumptions and the associativity and com-
mutativity of the comultiplication. 
A similar (and easy to prove) observation is that if f1, f2 : X → Y and g1, g2 : W → Z
are such that f1 =p-a.s. f2 for p : Θ → X and g1 =q-a.s. g2 for q : Φ → W , then also
(f1 ⊗ g1) =p⊗q (f2 ⊗ g2).
13.6. Remark. Almost sure equality can obviously always be weakened by precomposition:
if f =p-a.s. g, and if the codomain of q matches the domain of p, then also f =pq-a.s. g. The
causality axiom (Definition 11.31) provides conversely a way to decompose a relativizing
morphism: marginalizing its conclusion over the middle output shows that if f =pq-a.s. g,
whenever this makes sense, then also fp =q-a.s. gp. But regardless of whether the causality
axiom holds or not, f =p-a.s. g clearly implies fp = gp.
We now consider conditionals in the sense of Definition 11.5, and note that they are
almost surely unique [15, p. 22].
13.7. Proposition. Given a morphism ψ : I → X ⊗ Y , the conditional ψ|X : X → Y is
unique ψ(x)-a.s. (if it exists).
Here, ψ(x) is the marginal morphism I → X of the original ψ(x, y) in terms of No-
tation 2.8. The uniqueness statement means that any two such conditionals are ψ(x)-
a.s. equal.
Proof. This is an immediate consequence of the defining equation
X
ψ|X=
ψ
ψ
Y

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A related point is that almost sure equality lets us define categories of probability spaces
in C. A probability space in a Markov category C is a pair (X,ψ) where X ∈ C is an object
and ψ : I → X is a morphism playing the role of a distribution on X. If (X,ψ) and
(Y, φ) are probability spaces, then a morphism f : X → Y is measure-preserving if φ = fψ.
In the following definition, we impose the causality condition as an apparently necessary
hypothesis for our well-definedness argument below.
13.8. Definition. Suppose that C is causal (Definition 11.31). Then the category of prob-
ability spaces and Markov kernels ProbStoch(C) has as objects the probability spaces (X,ψ)
in C, and as morphisms (X,ψ) → (Y, φ) those maps f : X → Y which satisfy fψ = φ,
modulo ψ-a.s. equality, with composition inherited from C.
In categories like FinStoch and Stoch, the condition fψ = φ says exactly that f should
be measure-preserving in the usual sense.
13.9. Proposition. Suppose that C is causal.
(a) Composition in ProbStoch(C) is well-defined, and ProbStoch(C) inherits the sym-
metric monoidal structure from C.
(b) If C has conditionals, then ProbStoch(C) is isomorphic to the category of couplings
described in Remark 12.10.
For (b), recall that the existence of conditionals implies causality (Proposition 11.34),
so that only the existence of conditionals needs to be verified when applying this to a given
Markov category C. We do not know whether the well-definedness of composition would
still hold without causality.
Proof. (a) Concerning the well-definedness, let f, f ′ : X → Y and g : Y → Z
be representative morphisms between probability spaces (X,ψ), (Y, φ) and (Z, π),
and suppose that f =ψ-a.s. f
′. Then we get gf =ψ-a.s. gf
′ by Lemma 13.4. Well-
definedness in g follows from the causality property of Definition 11.31: the as-
sumption g =φ-a.s. g
′ means that
ψ
g′
f
=
ψ
g
f
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and therefore applying causality and marginalizing over the middle output results
in the desired equation
ψ
f
g′
=
ψ
f
g
Hence composition is well-defined.
The monoidal structure on ProbStoch(C) is given by
(X,ψ) ⊗ (Y, φ) := (X ⊗ Y, I
∼=
→ I ⊗ I
ψ⊗φ
−→ X ⊗ Y ),
and similarly on morphisms. With the structure isomorphisms also inherited from
C in the obvious way, it is straightforward to check that we indeed get a symmetric
monoidal category.
(b) We first establish the bijection between the hom-sets: to a given morphism f :
(X,ψ)→ (Y, φ) represented by f ∈ C(X,Y ), we assign the joint I → X ⊗ Y given
by [55, Section 7.1]
ψ
f
Clearly f itself is a conditional of this distribution with respect to the first output,
and this assignment establishes a bijection between ψ-a.s. equivalence classes of
morphisms f : X → Y satisfying φ = fψ and couplings, i.e. morphisms I →
X⊗Y with marginals ψ and φ. Moreover, together with the formula (12.4) for the
conditional product, it is easy to see that this bijection respects composition. 
For example, (a) allows us to construct ProbStoch(Stoch), the category of all probability
spaces and measure-preserving maps modulo almost sure equality27, since we already know
Stoch to be causal (Example 11.35).
13.10. Remark. If C has conditionals, we now sketch how Bayesian inversion equips the
category ProbStoch(C) with a symmetric monoidal dagger functor in the sense of dagger
categories28. Since this applies in particular to BorelStoch by Example 11.7, this generalizes
a recent result due to Clerc, Danos, Dahlqvist and Garnier, who proved this in explicit
27Assuming that almost sure equality is defined appropriately, namely as in Example 13.3.
28This means that −† : Cop → C is identity-on-objects, satisfies (gf)† = f†g† and f†† = f and id† = id
and (g ⊗ f)† = g† ⊗ f†, and is such that the dagger of any symmetric monoidal structure isomorphism is
its inverse. The latter holds in our case because the dagger of any deterministic isomorphism is its inverse,
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measure-theoretic terms for BorelStoch [23, Theorem 2.10]. Concretely, if f : (X,ψ) →
(Y, φ) is a morphism represented by f : X → Y with fψ = φ, then we get a morphism
f † : (Y, φ)→ (X,ψ) represented by any f † : Y → X satisfying the equation
ψ
f
=
φ
f †
(13.2)
This equation expresses the property that f † should be a conditional on Y for the joint
I → X⊗Y depicted in (13.2). In terms of the characterization as the category of couplings
stated in Proposition 13.9(b), this dagger functor is a mere bookkeeping device, swapping
couplings I → X⊗Y to couplings I → Y ⊗X by composition with swapX,Y : X⊗Y → Y ⊗X.
This characterization can be used to give a simple proof of the fact that the defining
properties of a symmetric monoidal dagger functor are satisfied.
In conclusion, for any Markov category C which has conditionals, Bayesian inversion is
implemented by a symmetric monoidal dagger functor on ProbStoch(C).
Returning to the theory of almost surely, we believe that other concepts of probability
and statistics can and should be relativized similarly with respect to almost surely in a
similar way as Definition 13.1 does for equality, by starting with the original definition and
composing it with p followed by copyX : X → X ⊗X. For concreteness and future use, we
show what this amounts to in the case of Definition 10.1.
13.11. Definition. Given p : Θ→ X, we say that f : X → Y is p-a.s. deterministic if
f f
=f
p p
In other words, we now postulate the determinism equation only with respect to p-
a.s. equality. We typically expect such relativizations to respect a.s. equality, which is
indeed what happens in this case:
13.12. Lemma. Let p : Θ → X. If f, g : X → Y are such that g =p-a.s. f and f is
p-a.s. deterministic, then so is g.
which applies to the structure isomorphisms by Lemma 10.12. All of these properties are straightforward
to check.
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Proof. We use the assumptions to compute
=g
p
f f
=f
p p
g g
=
p
where the last step is by Lemma 13.5. 
13.13. Example. Generalizing Example 10.4, in Stoch a morphism f is p-a.s. deterministic
if for all θ ∈ Θ we have
∫
x∈R
f(S|x) f(T |x) p(dx|θ) =
∫
x∈R
f(S ∩ T ) p(dx|θ)
for all R ∈ ΣX and S, T ∈ ΣY . The universal quantification over R implies that the
integrands x 7→ f(S|x)f(T |x) and x 7→ f(S ∩ T |x) are p(−|θ)-almost surely equal for all θ.
By reasoning analogous to Example 10.4, we thereby obtain that f is p-a.s. deterministic
if and only if for every S ∈ ΣX we have f(S|x) ∈ {0, 1} at least p(−|θ)-almost surely for
every θ.
13.14. Remark. Assuming that C is causal, we can restrict the category ProbStoch(C)
considered in Proposition 13.9 to the almost surely deterministic morphisms, resulting in
a symmetric monoidal subcategory Prob(C) ⊆ ProbStoch(C) which we call the category
of probability spaces in C. More precisely, a morphism (X,ψ) → (Y, φ) represented by
f ∈ C(X,Y ) is in ProbStoch(C) if and only if f is ψ-a.s. deterministic. Lemma 13.12 shows
that this property does not depend on the choice of representative. The fact that Prob(C)
is closed under composition again follows from the causality property: the assumption that
g is fψ-a.s. deterministic gives
f
ψ
g
=
g g
ψ
f
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thanks to causality, and the assumption that f is ψ-a.s. deterministic allows us to write
g g
ψ
f
=
g g
ψ
f f
so that both steps together prove the claim.
Finally, it is easy to see that Prob(C) is indeed closed under monoidal product and
contains the structure isomorphisms by Lemma 10.12, so that it indeed forms a symmetric
monoidal subcategory of ProbStoch(C) if C is causal.
We now consider some relations between almost sure determinism and the positivity
axiom discussed in Definition 11.22 and after. This following observation is in the spirit of
Lemma 10.9.
13.15. Proposition. Suppose that f : X → Y and g : Y → Z in C are such that gf is
deterministic. Suppose also that
(a) f is deterministic, or
(b) C is positive (Definition 11.22).
Then g is f -a.s. deterministic.
In particular, if gf = id and C is positive, then g is f -a.s. deterministic. Example 11.27
shows that gf = id alone is not enough to imply that g is f -a.s. deterministic.
Proof. (a) This is a straightforward string diagram computation,
=g
f
f
f
=
g
f f f
gg
=
gg
f
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(b) We use the positivity equation of Lemma 11.24 repeatedly together with associa-
tivity,
=g
f
f
g
=
f f
f
g g
f
g g
f
= =
g
g
f
=
f
g g
f

In the proof of Theorem 14.5, we will need a stronger positivity condition than Defini-
tion 11.22 obtained by relativizing almost surely.
13.16. Definition. We say that C is strictly positive if whenever morphisms
Θ X Y Z
p f g
are such that gf is p-a.s. deterministic, then also
g
f
g
=p-a.s.
f
f (13.3)
13.17. Remark. Carrying an extra p : Θ → X around in the proof of Proposition 13.15
shows the following more general statement. Suppose that gf is p-a.s. deterministic, and
that also
(a) f is p-a.s. deterministic, or
(b) C is strictly positive.
Then g is fp-a.s. deterministic.
As a generalization of Lemma 11.24, we have:
13.18. Lemma. If C has conditionals, then C is strictly positive.
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Proof. Use the same s as in (11.9), and then do the analogous computation as in the
proof of Lemma 11.24 while carrying the additional p along. 
In particular, FinStoch and Gauss are strictly positive. For Stoch, we need a separate
argument generalizing Example 11.25.
13.19. Example. Stoch is strictly positive, as we show now. By the characterization of
p-a.s. deterministic morphisms of Example 13.13, the assumption is that∫
y∈Y
g(S|y) f(dy|x) ∈ {0, 1} (13.4)
for all S ∈ ΣX and p(−|θ)-almost all x ∈ X and all θ ∈ Θ. What we want to prove is that
the equation ∫
y∈T
g(S|y) f(dy|x) = f(T |y)
∫
y∈Y
g(S|y) f(dy|x)
holds for all S ∈ ΣX and T ∈ ΣY for p(−|θ)-almost all x ∈ X and all θ. This is by the
same argument as in Example 11.25.
As a final note, let us propose one more definition which can be nicely formulated in
terms of almost sure equality, although we will not study it any further in this paper.
13.20. Definition. Let C be a Markov category. For any morphism p : A→ X, the support
supp(p) is any object which represents the functor
C(X,−)/ =p-a.s. : C −→ Set
mapping every object Y to the set of equivalence classes of morphisms X → Y modulo p-a.s.
equality.
More concretely, this means that supp(p) comes equipped with a universal morphism
i : supp(p) → X having the property that for every Y ∈ C, composition with i induces
a bijection between morphisms supp(p) → Y and p-a.s. equivalence classes of morphisms
X → Y .
13.21. Remark. While this is somewhat speculative at the present stage, our hope is that
this notion of support will specialize to the usual notion of support of a Radon probability
measure on a locally compact space, or more generally that of a τ -smooth probability
measure on any topological space, when applied to morphisms I → X in a suitable Markov
category with topological spaces as objects. So far we have not considered such a category
yet.
As is usually the case for an object specified in terms of a universal property, the support
supp(p) may or may not exist for a given morphism p in a given category C.
13.22. Question. Suppose that supp(p) exists. Then does p : A → X necessarily factor
through i : supp(p)→ X? Is i necessarily deterministic?
As easily follows from the following example, the answer to both questions is positive
in the case of FinStoch.
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13.23. Example. In FinStoch, the support of any morphism p exists, and is exactly the
support in the usual sense,
supp(p) = {x ∈ X | ∃a : p(x|a) > 0},
where the universal morphism i : supp(p) → X is the inclusion map. The universality is
easy to prove as a consequence of Example 13.2.
Finally, we remark that the existence of supports can be useful for simplifying arguments
which involve relativization with respect to almost surely.
13.24. Proposition. If every morphism in C has a support and C is positive (Defini-
tion 11.22), then C is also strictly positive (Definition 13.16).
Proof. Straightforward. 
14. Sufficient statistics and the Fisher–Neyman factorization theorem
We finally move on to the treatment of statistics within our formalism, comprising this
section and the following two. Informally, a statistic is a function of a random sample
intended to capture the essential information contained in this sample. Perhaps the most
common example is the sample mean: tossing a coin n ≫ 1 times results in a probability
distribution over 2n outcomes, or in our setting a morphism I → {heads, tails}n. The sample
mean is the map {heads, tails}n → [0, 1] which maps a sequence of outcomes to the relative
frequency of (say) heads, which is the essential information contained in the sequence,
assuming that the individual throws are independent. This independence assumption is a
statistical model : a hypothesis about a distribution which comes in the form of a collection
of distributions on the sample space X, in this case {heads, tails}n, parametrized by a
parameter space Θ, in this case the space of probability distributions describing a single
toss, which we can identify with [0, 1]. In other words, a statistical model is a Markov
kernel Θ→ X [91].
14.1. Definition. Given a sample space X ∈ C, a statistical model with values in X
consists of another object Θ ∈ C and a morphism p : Θ→ X.
Put yet differently, a statistical model for X is an object in the slice category over X.
This notion of statistical model is the simplest and most naive version, where one considers
only a single fixed sample spaceX; for a more refined notion and detailed discussion, see [91]
as well as the repetitive structures of [77].29
While our definition of statistical model keeps track of an explicit parametrization of all
distributions via a parameter space Θ, one can alternatively omit this parametrization and
consider categories of unparametrized statistical models, which are mere sets of probability
distributions [70, Definition 2.20]. We view this difference as relatively minor, since a set
of probability distributions can always be taken to be parametrized by itself.
29It seems plausible to us that McCullagh’s and Lauritzen’s refined definitions fit perfectly well into
our formalism as well by working within a suitable categories of diagrams (Section 7), but we have not yet
worked out the details of this.
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14.2. Definition. A statistic for a statistical model p : Θ→ X is a deterministic morphism
s : X → V to some other object V .
This is essentially the traditional definition (modulo subtleties like those of Exam-
ple 10.4, depending on which category C we are working in).
By combining a statistic t : X → V with a statistical model p : Θ → X, we obtain a
morphism Θ→ V ⊗X which describes the joint distribution over sample space and statistic
as a function of the model parameter,
p
s
X V
Θ
By construction, this morphism displays the conditional independence Θ ⊥⊥ V |X (Defini-
tion 12.19).
An important property which a statistic may or may not have is its sufficiency. Intu-
itively, a sufficient statistic for a statistical model is as informative than the full sample.
14.3. Definition. A statistic s : X → V for a statistical model p : Θ → X is sufficient if
there is α : V → X such that
p
α
s
X V
p
s
X V
=
Θ Θ
(14.1)
Formulating sufficiency in terms of the existence of such a morphism is certainly not
new and has been considered previously in more concrete ways, e.g. in Dawid’s work on
statistical operations [25, Example III(a)]. Also Golubtsov [54, Section 7] already seems to
have envisioned the possibility of giving such an abstract categorical definition of sufficiency.
We also say that α is a sufficiency witness for s if the above condition holds; another
way to phrase it is to say that the morphism on the left in (14.1) displays the conditional
independence Θ ⊥⊥ X |V in addition to Θ ⊥⊥ V |X, which is a well-known way to formu-
late sufficiency. Also note the similarity of this condition with Bayesian inversion (13.2).
Remarkably, the condition automatically implies that α almost surely splits s in the sense
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that sα =sp-a.s. idV ,
p
α
s
=
p
s s
s
=
p
s
(14.2)
where the first equation is by sufficiency and the second one because s is deterministic. So
intuitively, sufficiency means that given a value of the statistic s, applying α plays the role
of making an inference over the corresponding outcomes in X which give rise to that value
of s, and in such a way that this distribution coincides with the conditional distribution
over outcomes given any parameter value. While the morphism α does play a role similar
to that of a conditional, our definition may also be of interest in categories which do not
have conditionals, such as Stoch (Example 11.3).
Sufficient statistics enjoy the following compositionality property, inspired by a simi-
lar compositionality result of Jost, Leˆ, Luu and Tran in their more specific setting [70,
Theorem 2.28(1)].
14.4. Lemma. Let s : X → V and t : V →W be statistics. If s is sufficient for p and t is
sufficient for sp, then also the composite ts is sufficient for p.
Proof. Suppose that α : V → X is a sufficiency witness for s with respect to p and
β : W → V is a sufficiency witness for t with respect to the pushforward model sp. Then
we show that αβ is a sufficiency witness for ts with respect to p,
p
α
s
p
s
t
=
t
p
β
α
s
t
=
using the respective assumed instances of (14.1). 
Here is an abstract characterization of sufficient statistics, which seems to be a close
relative of or version of the Fisher–Neyman factorization theorem.
14.5. Theorem. Suppose that C is strictly positive (Definition 13.16). Then a statistic
s : X → V is sufficient for a statistical model p : Θ→ X if and only if there is α : V → X
such that αsp = p and sα =sp-a.s. idV .
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More precisely, α : V → X is a sufficiency witness if and only if it satisfies these
alternative conditions. Since we have already assembled all the relevant ingredients, the
proof is now essentially trivial.
Proof. The “only if” direction is trivial by marginalization of (14.1) and by (14.2). For
the “if” direction, we show that αsp = p and sα =sp-a.s. id together imply (14.1). Indeed,
p
s
sp
s
= α =
p
s
α
where both steps are by assumption, and the second one also uses the strict positivity
property of (13.3). 
We now illustrate the relation to the Fisher–Neyman factorization theorem in the case
of our basic running example.
14.6. Example. Consider FinStoch, where statistics are just functions between finite sets.
Now consider the equation αsp = p from Theorem 14.5, which becomes
p(x|θ) =
∑
v,x′
α(x|v) s(v|x′) p(x′|θ).
The condition sα =sp-a.s. idV implies that the sum over v has only one contributing term,
namely v = s(x), where s now also denotes the underlying function of finite sets by abuse
of notation. Therefore
p(x|θ) = α(x|s(x))
∑
x′ : s(x′)=s(x)
p(x′|θ).
This is the Fisher–Neyman factorization into one term which only depends on x, and one
term which depends on θ and where the dependence on x is only through s(x). Conversely,
given a Fisher–Neyman factorization
p(x|θ) = gθ(s(x))h(x),
we construct α satisfying the required properties. We can assume without loss of generality
that for every v ∈ V there is x ∈ s−1(v) and θ ∈ Θ with p(x|θ) > 0, since on all other v
we can define α(−|v) arbitrarily. Then we get that the denominator in the first case of the
expression
α(x|v) :=


(∑
x′∈s−1(v) h(x
′)
)−1
h(x) if s(x) = v,
0 otherwise
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is nonzero, making it well-defined. Now sα =sp-a.s. id holds by construction, and plugging
in the above expressions gives
(αsp)(x|θ) =
∑
x′∈X
α(x|s(x′)) p(x′|θ) =
∑
x′∈s−1(x)
α(x|s(x)) p(x′|θ) = p(x|θ),
as was to be shown.
We leave the investigation of further instances of Theorem 14.5 to future work, and
in particular the problem of determining whether our result also specializes to the stan-
dard Fisher–Neyman factorization theorem in its general measure-theoretic form [61, Corol-
lary 1].
15. Complete morphisms, ancillary statistics, and Basu’s theorem
Basu’s theorem [5, Theorem 2] is a classical result on the independence of a complete
sufficient statistic from any ancillary statistic. Let us start by discussing the more myste-
rious notion of completeness, introduced by Lehmann and Scheffe´ in 1950 [82, Section 3].
We first explain how it secretly is a concept that applies to general morphisms in every
Markov category.
Recall from Remark 13.6 that if g =f -a.s. h for f : X → Y and g, h : Y → Z, then also
gf = hf . Now f is defined to be complete if the converse holds as well.
15.1. Definition. A morphism f : X → Y is complete if gf = hf implies g =f-a.s. h.
This definition is in the spirit of Dawid’s [25, Definition 4.1]. Note that at our level of
abstraction, we have no way to distinguish between complete and bounded complete. We
will prove in Example 15.4 that in Stoch, our definition actually reproduces the latter.
15.2. Remark. The main difference between our definition and the standard one is termi-
nological: while standardly, completeness is a property of a statistic s relative to a statistical
model p, we consider it rather as a property of the composite morphism sp, since it only
depends on the latter. In other words, completeness is best viewed a property of Markov
kernels, or more generally morphisms in a Markov category.
15.3. Example. In FinStoch, a morphism f : X → Y is complete if and only if the affine
hull of im(f) is a face of the probability simplex over Y . For example, an f : I → Y is
complete if and only if it is a Dirac measure, or equivalently if and only if it is deterministic.
To see that this characterization holds, it is most instructive to present a geometrical
argument. We think of morphisms g, h : Y → Z as affine maps from the probability simplex
over Y to the probability simplex over Z. Now recall from Example 13.23 that g =f -a.s. h
if and only if the restrictions of g and h to supp(f) coincide, where supp(f) ⊆ Y is the set
of all y ∈ Y for which there is x ∈ X with f(y|x) > 0. We can identify the support supp(f)
with the probability simplex over supp(f), as included in the probability simplex over Y as
a face. Therefore g =f -a.s. h if and only if g and h coincide on the smallest face containing
im(f).
Similarly, gf = hf holds if and only if g and h coincide on im(f), or equivalently on
the affine hull of im(f). We can now show that gf = hf implies g =f -a.s. h if and only
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if the affine hull of im(f) is a face. By the above, the “if” direction is clear; for the “only
if” part, we prove the contrapositive: if the affine hull of im(f) is not a face, then there
are g and h with gf = hf but not g =f -a.s. h. We prove the equivalent statement that for
any affine subset30 of the probability simplex over Y , there is Z together with morphisms
g, h : Y → Z which are equal on the affine subset, but not anywhere outside of it. Since
the probability simplex over X is bounded, we can ignore the requirement that g and h
must again land in a probability simplex, and instead find two such affine maps into some
Euclidean space; composing with a suitable invertible contraction and translation will map
them back into a finite-dimensional simplex. Now the solution is obvious: for example, take
g to be the identity map and h the orthogonal projection onto the affine subspace (with
respect to any choice of inner product).
15.4. Example. Now consider completeness in Stoch. Here, we claim that f : X → Y is
complete if and only if for every bounded measurable β : Y → R,∫
y∈Y
β(y) f(dy|x) = 0 ∀x =⇒ β(y) = 0 f(−|x)-a.s. ∀x. (15.1)
This is essentially the standard definition of bounded complete.
To prove the equivalence, suppose first that f is complete in our sense. Then for given
β satisfying the vanishing integral assumption, suppose β : Y → [0, 1] without loss of
generality by rescaling. Then with the power set σ-algebra on {0, 1}, we have a morphism
in Stoch given by
g : Y → {0, 1}, g({1}|y) := β(y),
where all other values of g are clearly uniquely specified and the measurability condition
on g holds as β is measurable. We now have the composite morphism
gf : X → {0, 1}, (gf)({1}|x) =
∫
y∈Y
β(y) f(dy|x) = 0,
which coincides with hf : X → {0, 1} for h : Y → {0, 1} the deterministic constant zero
morphism, h({1}|y) = 0 for all y. Therefore the completeness assumption on f implies
g =f -a.s. h. Using (13.1) with T = {1} only, this is equivalent to∫
y∈S
β(y) f(dy|x) =
∫
y∈S
0 f(dy|x) = 0
for all S ∈ ΣY . This implies that β(y) indeed vanishes f(−|x)-almost surely for every x,
proving (15.1).
Conversely, suppose that f is bounded complete in the sense of (15.1). For given
g, h : Y → Z with gf = hf , we will prove that∫
y∈S
g(T |y) f(dy|x) =
∫
y∈S
h(T |y) f(dy|x) (15.2)
30An affine subset of the simplex is given by the intersection of the simplex with an affine subspace, or
equivalently by suitably many hyperplanes.
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for all x ∈ X and S ∈ ΣY and T ∈ ΣZ , which is what needs to be shown by (13.1). For
fixed S and T , consider the function
β : Y −→ [0, 1], y 7−→ g(T |y)− h(T |y),
which is bounded measurable by construction. Now the integral of β with respect to every
f(−|dx) vanishes by the assumption that gf = hf , which amounts exactly to equality of
the integrals for S = Y . Therefore β itself vanishes f(−|x)-almost surely for every x thanks
to the assumption (15.1). This immediately implies (15.2).
We have therefore established that our abstract notion of completeness instantiates
concretely to the one which is most relevant for measure-theoretic probability. Returning
to the general theory, a simple first observation about completeness is as follows.
15.5. Lemma. Every deterministic morphism is complete.
Proof. Assuming gf = hf for deterministic f , we compute
g
f
ff
g
=
h
f
ff
h
==
which means exactly g =f -a.s. h. 
We have not yet studied other properties of complete morphisms, such as their compo-
sitionality. A simple use of completeness is to provide a simplified criterion for sufficiency.
15.6. Proposition. Suppose that C is strictly positive (Definition 13.16). Let p : Θ → X
be a statistical model and s : X → V a statistic such that sp is complete. Then s is sufficient
if and only if there is α : V → X such that αsp = p.
Proof. Applying Theorem 14.5, the condition sα =sp-a.s. id follows from sαsp = sp by
the completeness assumption. 
The other missing ingredient for Basu’s theorem is the notion of ancillary statistic,
which formalizes the idea that a statistic carries no information at all about the parameters
of a statistical model.
15.7. Definition. A statistic s : X → V for a statistical model p : Θ → X is ancillary if
sp displays Θ ⊥⊥ T | I, which means that
s
p
=
ψ
for suitable ψ : I → V .
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Here is our version of Basu’s theorem:
15.8. Theorem. Suppose that p : Θ → X is a statistical model, and that s : X → V and
a : X → W are statistics. If s is sufficient, the composite morphism sp is complete, and a
is ancillary, then the morphism
p
s a
V W
Θ
(15.3)
displays V ⊥W ||Θ.
The morphism (15.3) represents the joint distribution of the statistics s and a, given
the model parameter.
Proof. Let β : V → X be a splitting of s which witnesses its sufficiency. Then we
have
p
s
β
a
=
p
a
=
ψ
p
s
for suitable ψ : I → U , where the first step is by the sufficiency of s and the second since
a is ancillary. Using that sp is complete, we obtain
p
s a
= =
p
β
s
a
p
s
ψ
=
p
s
ψ
where the first step is by sufficiency of s and the second by completeness of sp and the previ-
ous equation. This factorization implies in particular the desired conditional independence
V ⊥W ||Θ. 
15.9. Remark. Thanks to the characterization of completeness as bounded completeness
in Stoch (Example 15.4), Theorem 15.8 reproduces essentially the standard version of Basu’s
theorem in the case of Stoch.
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16. Minimal sufficient statistics and Bahadur’s theorem
While sufficient statistics are useful in that they contain maximal information about
the parameters, in practice one also wants a statistic to discard as much irrelevant infor-
mation as possible. This is formalized by the notion of minimal sufficient statistic, which
this section develops within our framework. We will prove Bahadur’s theorem, a classical
result giving a sufficient criterion for the minimality of a sufficient statistic in terms of
completeness.
Leading up to the definition of minimality, we first investigate how different statistics
may determine each other:
16.1. Definition. Let s : X → V and t : X → W be statistics for a statistical model
p : Θ→ X. Then we write t ≤ s if there is c : V →W such that t =p-a.s. cs.
Such a c must be sp-a.s. deterministic by Remark 13.17, since s is deterministic and cs
is p-a.s. deterministic by Lemma 13.12.
It is easy to see that the ≤-relation on statistics is reflexive and transitive. In this way,
the collection of statistics for a given statistical model forms a preordered set31, with the
more informative statistics further up. This preorder is reminiscent of the standard theory
of subobjects in category theory [88, Section 1.3], but with the direction of arrows reversed.
The idea of defining an informativeness ordering of this type in categorical terms is certainly
not new and appears e.g. also in the work of Golubtsov [55, Section 5], who has used it to
develop aspects of decision theory in purely categorical terms [55, Sections 6 and 7].
We now restrict to the set of sufficient statistics with the induced preorder. Recall that
a least element s in a preordered set is an element such that s ≤ r for all other elements r.
16.2. Definition. A statistic s : X → T is minimal sufficient if it is a least element in the
preordered set of sufficient statistics for the given model p : Θ→ X.
Since any two least elements are ordered in both directions, a minimal sufficient statistic
is essentially unique: any two minimal sufficient statistics can be computed from each other
in the sense of Definition 16.1.
Here is our version of Bahadur’s theorem, showing that under mild assumptions, a
complete sufficient statistic is guaranteed to be minimal.
16.3. Theorem. Suppose that C is strictly positive. Let p : Θ → X be a statistical model
which has a minimal sufficient statistic. If s : X → V is a complete sufficient statistic for
p, then s is minimal sufficient.
Proof. If there is a minimal sufficient statistic, then s must lie above it. By Defini-
tion 16.1, this means that there is some c : V → W such that cs is minimal. In order to
show that s itself is minimal, we therefore only need to show that s ≤ cs. Since cs is still
sufficient, we have a sufficiency witness β : W → X for cs, satisfying csβ =csp-a.s. id and
p = βcsp by Theorem 14.5.
31Or, depending on how large the category C is, a proper class equipped with a preorder. We will
ignore these size issues here, for which Grothendieck universes provide the standard working solution.
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Since s is sufficient as well, we have a witness α : V → X with sα =sp-a.s. id and
p = αsp. Hence αsp = βcsp, and completeness of sp now implies α =sp-a.s. βc, and therefore
sβc =sp-a.s. id by postcomposing with s. We now claim that s =p-a.s. sβcs. Indeed,
p
s
β
c
p
α
s
=
p
α
s
=
s
β
c
s
p
=
s
using sufficiency of s in the first and third step. This proves that s ≤ cs, as was to be
shown. 
We end with two possible avenues for further research.
16.4. Problem. Under which conditions on C does every statistical model in C have a
minimal sufficient statistic?
We suspect that it is possible to derive the existence of minimal sufficient statistics
from the assumption that C has all colimits and that these colimits interact suitably nicely
with the Markov category structure, in a precise way which still needs to be determined.
For then it may be possible to obtain a minimal sufficient statistic by taking the colimit
of the diagram consisting of all sufficient statistics out of X for a given statistical model
p : Θ→ X. (A suitable co-well-poweredness assumption may be relevant for this as well.)
16.5. Remark. Following Lauritzen [77], another interesting avenue may be to consider the
inverse problem of finding all statistical models p : Θ→ X for which a given deterministic
morphism s : X → V is a sufficient statistic.
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